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NDIAN tribes have enjoyed a variety of curious legal statuses and rela-
tionships with the United States and individual states. In the early
nineteenth century, tribes were recognized as sovereign nations, separate
from the states but subject to the jurisdiction of the federal government
by terms of treaties.' In the early twentieth century, tribes were identified
as dependent, distinct, and uncivilized communities subject to plenary
federal control.2 Currently, tribes are deemed to possess attributes of sov-
ereignty, manifest in limited rights of self-government, derived from fed-
eral policy.3 This Article traces the changes in the federal judiciary's
view of Indian tribes and attempts to identify the ideological values that
drove those changes. The Article focuses on judicial opinions because so
much of Indian law is judge-made, having developed with little guidance
from the Constitution or any other source of law.4 In creating and devel-
oping Indian law, federal judges drew on their ideas and assumptions
about sovereignty, the power and role of government, and the role of the
* Associate, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Washington D.C.; B.A. Cornell Univer-
sity, 1982; J.D. State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, 1987.
The author thanks Guyora Binder, Fred Konefsky, and Tom Jensen for comments on earlier drafts
of the Article. Errors, if any, are the author's alone.
1. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
2. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
3. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
4. The Constitution refers to Indians twice:
The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ....
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall
be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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citizen. This Article, therefore, explores the values and images underly-
ing Indian law doctrines and decisions. Because the status of Indian
tribes is inextricably linked to the rights and powers of the federal and
state sovereigns, this Article examines the judiciary's view of those sover-
eigns and their interrelationships also.
The judiciary has drawn on two very different political traditions,
republicanism and imperialism, to inform its Indian law decisions. Re-
publicanism is based on a community model of political relationships.
Republican sovereignty derives from the people and is committed to
maintaining the freedom, equality, and participation of all members of
the republic. Power exercised to another end, or that upsets the equal
distribution of freedom among members, is illegitimate and no longer
sovereign. In contrast, imperial sovereignty is based on de facto power. It
is committed to achieving the empire's military and commercial
supremacy. The empire thrives on inequality and hierarchy as the best
organization to fulfill its aims. The Founders called on both traditions in
creating the dual sovereignty of the federal government and the states
within the federalist system. When the courts had to define a third type
of sovereign, the tribes, they too turned to these traditions.
In the early nineteenth century, John Marshall viewed the federal
sovereigns as an empire, capable of extending its authority over the tribes
to the extent that their strength and power allowed.' Later in the cen-
tury, a federal court invoked images of the republic to find that Indians
living like white people were part of the state polity, while those still
living like Indians were subject to federal control.' In the second half of
the nineteenth century, the judiciary enforced a stronger imperial vision
of federal power, as the federal government assumed greater control over
the tribes and managed them to serve its expansion. At the same time,
republican principles persisted to exclude Indians from citizenship and
membership in the federal political community.7 In the twentieth cen-
tury, following the New Deal, federal power continued to grow and be-
come more centralized, bureaucratic, and imperial, while republican
principles continued to exclude the tribes from state jurisdiction.8 In the
second half of the century, republican rhetoric disappeared from judicial
opinions altogether. Now, tribal and state powers depend on federal pol-
icy, that is, the discretion of the federal sovereign. The federal sovereign
5. See infra notes 71-102 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 128-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
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determines, much as an empire would, the relationship of the states and
tribes, and the power each possesses.9 This history of Indian law, there-
fore, reflects not only how the judiciary has viewed the tribes and their
members. It reflects also how the federal judiciary has viewed federal and
state sovereignty, the relationship between them, and how those visions
have changed.
Part II of this Article explains the traditions of republicanism and
imperialism. Part III studies colonial and federal policies and doctrines
through the middle of the nineteenth century and analyzes how they re-
flect republican and imperial values. Part IV chronicles how republican
and imperial visions interacted in the opinions and policies of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the nation expanded and de-
veloped a commercial economy. Finally, Part V studies the Indian poli-
cies and opinions of the last fifty years and traces the rise of imperial
images and the demise of republican values.
II. THE REPUBLIC AND THE EMPIRE
In defining the relationships of the federal government, the states,
and the tribes, the federal judiciary has invoked two conflicting political
traditions: republicanism and imperialism. Americans inherited republi-
canism from the classical political theories of Aristotle, the renaissance
theories of Machiavelli, the "Country" ideology of seventeenth century
Britain, and the political theories of Harrington. 10 Republican ideology
influenced the structure of the government of the United States, particu-
larly under the Articles of Confederation.' It justified the Founders' reli-
ance on the people and their consent as the source of sovereign power.
The young nation's fear that political parties, standing armies, and a na-
tional bank would subvert the peoples' capacity to exercise their sover-
eign authority manifested republican values.12 But America inherited a
tradition of imperialism also. America found these values in history, spe-
9. See infra notes 234-46 and accompanying text.
10. For a study of the development of republican theory from Aristotle to the American
Revolution, see J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
11. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 354-429 (1969)
(discussing government under the Articles of Confederation).
12. Such institutions represent the classic sources of corruption in the forms of divisiveness,
dependency, and commerce. J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 463-64; G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 401-
03.
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cifically in the histories of the Roman and British empires. 13 The Ameri-
can colonies were the product of European imperialism and, in the
eighteenth century, were recognized as the future of the British empire.14
Before the struggle for independence, the colonies appreciated their po-
tential for imperial grandeur 5 and fought to fulfill that potential. 6 Para-
doxically, the colonists invoked republican rhetoric to achieve that
independence. 17 Following the Revolutionary War, republican theories
flourished and were incorporated into the Articles of Confederation. 8
But in time, fear of majoritarian tyranny and excessive state power, at the
expense of military and commercial strength and personal rights,
prompted reforms to increase aristocratic or elite authority and imperial
national power under the Constitution.' 9
13. See R. KOEBNER, EMPIRE (1961) (reviewing the theme of empire in the history of political
thought through the American Revolution).
14. Id. at 86. Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1760:
"I have long been of opinion that the foundations of the future grandeur and stability of
the British Empire lie in America.... All the country from the St Lawrence to the
Mississippi will, in another century, be filled with British people .... Britain itself will
become vastly more populous by the increase of its commerce; the Atlantic sea will be
covered with [British] trading ships... ." The American foundations of the British Em-
pire, "though, like other foundations, they are low and little now ... they are neverthe-
less broad and strong enough to support the greatest political structure that human
wisdom ever yet erected."
Id. at 116 (quoting 4 THE WRITNGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 122 (A. Smyth ed. 1906) (emphasis
added)).
15. Koebner explains:
What in 1760 was called the American 'foundations of the future grandeur of the British
Empire' was in 1776 assumed to be the reality that gave to the United States a 'separate
and equal station... among the powers of the earth'. It was the vision of an American
world in emergence. On the first occasion it had appeared to herald a new epoch of the
British Empire; on the second it gave substance to a new political entity which denied
allegiance to that Empire.
Id. at 117.
16. R. VAN ALSTYNE, THE RISING AMERICAN EMPIRE 1-3 (1960). "The War of American
Independence was conceived and fought under the spell of an imperial idea .... It was the idea that
the continent of North America belonged, as of right, to the people of the thirteen colonies of the
Atlantic seaboard." Id. at 78.
17. See G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 3-45 (describing the ideology and rhetoric supporting colo-
nial independence).
18. Id. at 354-63.
19. See generally id. at 471-518 (describing the political and philosophical discussions of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787); R. VAN ALsTYNE, supra note 16, at 3 ("The framers of the
Constitution intended a Leviathan type of state, as Thomas Hobbes conceived it-one that would be
perpetual and not subject to revolution or withdrawal at the hands of its component parts.").
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A. The Republic
The republic is based on the equality, liberty, and political nature of
its citizens. Every citizen is considered to have the capacity and responsi-
bility to legislate-that is, to be civically active.2° The sovereign author-
ity of the state derives from the "intelligence and virtue of all citizens"
mobilized to legislate for the "public good."21 The public good is the
state of political equality, liberty, and participation on which the republic
depends. It is not an amorphous denomination of the majority's will.
Rather, the public good is universal and discernible within the republic.
Government that serves the interests of a few, rather than the interests of
the whole, is despotic and illegitimate.22 A republic can overcome des-
potism only if its citizens are capable of transcending particular differ-
ences between themselves to legislate for the welfare of the whole. The
greatest strength of the republic is this devotion to the welfare of the
people;23 its greatest weakness is its absolute dependence on the morality
of the people.24
The survival and success of a republic depends on two related fac-
tors: the virtue of its citizens and a uniform concept of the public good
among them. Virtue is the capacity of individuals to subordinate their
private and particular interests to the public and universal interests of the
whole.25 To be virtuous, citizens must be rational. Private and particular
wants are driven by irrational passions; the public and universal objects
of the republic are discerned and achieved only through reasoned con-
templation. 26 Although views of the public good may differ among citi-
20. Classical Aristotelian republican theory presumed humans to be inherently political:
Aristotle taught that every human activity was value-oriented in the sense that it
aimed at some theoretically identifiable good; that all value-oriented activity was social
in the sense that it was pursued by men in association with one another; and that the
polis or republic was the association within which all particular associations pursued
their particular ends.... .Citizenship was a universal activity, the polis a universal
community.
J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 67-68.
21. Id. at 94.
22. "A hidden oligarchy behind a republican facade must lack rationality, because it did not
direct the intelligence of all to the good of all; it must lack virtue, because it subjected the good of all
to the good as seen by a limited number .... Id.
23. "By definition [the republic] had no other end than the welfare of the people." G. WOOD,
supra note 11, at 55.
24. See id. at 65-70.
25. J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 36-38. "In a republic... each man must somehow be per-
suaded to submerge his personal wants into the greater good of the whole." G. WOOD, supra note 11,
at 68.
26. See J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 471-72.
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zens, each citizen must account for the welfare of others and must act to
fulfill whatever public good she or he conceives."
To overcome passions and to achieve virtue, citizens must be eco-
nomically independent and physically secure. Without this security, they
can perceive personal circumstances and needs only." Such preoccupa-
tion is corruption.29 Corruption threatens the virtue of every citizen and
the integrity of the republic by displacing public concerns and authority
with private interests and power.30 The greatest defense against corrup-
tion is widely and equally distributed private property.31 Property
secures economic independence and physical well-being so she or he can
deliberate the welfare of the republic and its members. Dependency,
therefore, is a source of corruption. An individual is dependent, regard-
less of cash holdings, if her or his wealth flows from other people. Reli-
ance on others for wealth subjects the citizen to the others' control. The
citizen cannot act her or his own conscience if others threaten the source
27. "[P]olitics was conceived to be not the reconciling but the transcending of the different
interests of the society in the search for the single common good .... "G. WOOD, supra note 11, at
58. "The ideal which republicanism was beautifully designed to express was still a harmonious inte-
gration of all parts of the community." Id. at 60.
28. The modem republican citizen, like
the Aristotelian citizen ... must have a household of his own to govern so that he may
not be another man's servant, so that he may be capable of attaining good in his own
person and so that he may apprehend the relation between his own good and that of the
polis.
J. PococK, supra note 10, at 203.
29. "If men no longer enjoyed the conditions thought necessary to make them capable of per-
ceiving the common good, all that each man was capable of perceiving was his own particular inter-
est .... Id. at 522.
30. "[L]oss of liberty and the corruption of the body politic occurred when men, by compulsion
or out of effeminancy, expected from others what they should have expected from themselves as
members of the public." Id. at 203-04. The classic example of such a substitution of public authority
for private obligation is the republic's use of mercenary soldiers:
The citizens would be corrupted because they permitted inferiors to do for them what
should be done for the public good; the mercenaries would be agents of that corruption
because they performed a public function without regard for the public good; and any
amibitious individual could set himself above the republic and destroy it, by bringing the
unthinking mercenaries to do for him what should only be done for the public, but had
been allowed by unthinking citizens to pass out of public control.
Id. at 204.
31. The principle of equality is the "life and soul" of the republic. G. WOOD, supra note 11, at
70 (quoting Ramsay, Oration on Advantages of American Independence, in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS
OF TiE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 375 (H. Niles ed. 1876)). Property carried with it the political
and moral capacity of the citizen to legislate for the public good. Political equality, therefore, could
be achieved only through equal distribution of property. However, rather than redistribute property
in the interest of political equality, the concept of "equality of opportunity" was developed to over-
come this conceptual inconvenience. See G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 70-75.
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of wealth for doing so. Because dependent forms of wealth, such as fi-
nance capital, rental properties, wages, and salaries, are subject to an-
other's willingness to pay, financiers, renters, mercenaries, bureaucrats,
and servants are not independent in the sense the republic requires.32
Although citizens may differ as to the true public good, their views
must be similar enough33 that inconsistent visions of the public good are
not pursued by factions.34 Factions subvert republican sovereignty be-
cause faction members pursue the interest of the faction at the expense of
the interests of the whole. The republic, therefore, cannot tolerate inter-
mediate groups that distract from contemplation of the public good or
undermine citizens' commitment to the welfare of the whole.
The requirement of a uniform public good limits the republic in two
significant ways. First, it restricts membership in the republic to people
of similar histories, customs, practices, and occupations.35 Second, it re-
stricts the geographical size of the republic to ensure that each citizen
participates in the legislative process. 36 Only through universal participa-
tion may the public good serve the interests of the republic as a whole.
The requirement of a virtuous citizenry is in tension with the re-
quirement of a unified vision of the public good because a republic cannot
fulfill one condition without failing the other. As the population increases
and the economy develops, the republic needs more land to support a
virtuous citizenry. If the republic fails to acquire more land, citizens will
turn to commerce for wealth and economic security. As they become
dependent on others for their wealth and subsistence, they will lose the
ability to overcome their passions and deliberate on the welfare of the
whole. The citizens no longer will be virtuous. But, if the republic ex-
pands to make more land available, it also exposes itself to the threat of
32. J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 464.
33. "What made the... republican emphasis on the collective welfare of the people comprehen-
sible was the assumption that the people ... were a homogeneous body whose 'interests when can-
didly considered are one.'" G. WOOD, supra, note 11, at 57-58.
34. "Corruption is the rise of factions, of overmighty citizens, a moral condition affecting the
powerful and their dependents with equal corrosiveness . 3..." J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 209.
35. One of the republican assumptions of the antifederalists was that
A republic, wholly based as it was on the suffrage of the people, had to possess a popula-
tion homogeneous in its customs and concerns. Otherwise the unitary public good, the
collective welfare of the people that made a republic what it was, would be lost in the
clashing of 'interests opposite and dissimilar in their nature.'.
G. WooD, supra note 11, at 500.
36. "The polity must be a perfect partnership of all citizens and all values since, if it was less, a
part would be ruling in the the name of the whole, subjecting particular goods to its own particular





Expansion poses three threats to a virtuous citizenry. First, if new
citizens do not share the interests of the established republic, their differ-
ences would threaten the shared vision of the public good necessary for
republican governance. Second, residents of the newly acquired area may
be unable to participate in the legislative process if the seat of govern-
ment is too far away. Third, people in areas acquired by conquest may
threaten the virtue of the citizenry by the inequality and subordination
their presence might foster.3" If defeated peoples are treated as citizens,
they may be dependent and incapable of legislating virtuously.39 If they
are held as slaves, their presence would infect the virtue of the citizens by
rendering those citizens dependent on slave labor. Therefore, in ex-
panding beyond its original borders to claim more land for its citizens, a
republic must be very discriminating. Only areas populated by persons of
similar heritage and interests, who are capable of being virtuous and who
will not disturb the political uniformity of the state, may be incorporated.
In addition to the threats posed by expansion, a republic is
threatened constantly by the corruption of commerce.4" While simple
trade is not inconsistent with republican virtue, commerce based on
credit is a dynamic force that undermines the virtue of the citizens and
the integrity of the republic. Credit introduces values that fluctuate with
the market or the judgment of another person.41 Commercial relations,
therefore, reduce the stability and certainty of a land-based society to the
instability and variability of the market. People cannot be virtuous in
such a society because the particular and changing values of the credit
economy overwhelm the universal and stable values of the land-based
economy. A republic can maintain the virtue of the people only by tying
all social and economic relations to land so that property, rather than
37. As Pocock phrased it, the republic "faced the dilemma, born of its finitude, that it could
escape neither expansion nor the corruption that followed expansion." Id. at 524.
38. See id. at 509-10.
39. For example, '"the Roman empire destroyed by force of arms all the republics and free
cities,' so that their virtue could never afterwards recover .... [Tihe loss of virtue in the other
peoples helped cause the decline of virtue in the Romans themselves .... Id. at 216-17.
40. Id. at 464.
41. Pocock explains:
Once property was seen to have a symbolic value, expressed in coin or credit, the foun-
dations of personalty themselves appeared imaginery or at best consensual: the individ-
ual could exist, even in his own sight, only at the fluctuating value imposed upon him by
his fellows, and these evaluations, though constant and public, were too irrationally per-
formed to be seen as act of political decision or virtue.
[Vol. 37
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cash wealth, is the source of status.4' In a society based on property,
social, economic, and political relations are secure and are guided toward
fulfilling the public good. But in a commercial society, passionate pursuit
of the market's fortunes replaces universal virtue in directing the citizens'
conduct.
The United States in the late eighteenth century seemed particularly
well-suited to overcome the threats of corruption that plagued the repub-
lics of history. A seemingly endless supply of land promised virtue for
generations to come.43 The absence of social rank and the lack of a devel-
oped credit system offered a foundation for an economy based on land
and equality. For the new nation, republican principles offered a mean-
ingful and feasible vision of sovereignty.
B. The Empire
Imperial sovereignty is very different from republican sovereignty. It
is based on de facto control of people, resources, and commerce.' It
connotes both military and commercial dominance.45 Like the republic,
the empire depends on its citizens mobilized to work toward a unified
public good. However, individuals within the empire are viewed as a re-
source; they are a source of strength, not a source of authority for the
sovereign.
Unlike the republic, the public good of the empire is dynamic and
consumptive.46 It is directed toward securing the commercial and mili-
tary power of the empire as a whole, and exploiting "rewarding establish-
ments" beyond its borders.47 This public good exists apart from the
people; it is not determined by them. Rather, it is the object toward
42. In the 18th century
[t]he landed man... was permitted the leisure and autonomy to consider what was to
others' good as well as his own; but the individual engaged in exchange could discern
only particular values-that of the commodity which was his, that of the commodity for
which he exchanged it. His activity did not oblige or even permit him to contemplate the
universal good as he acted upon it, and he consequently continued to lack classical
rationality.
Id.
43. Id. at 535.
44. See generally R. KOEBNER, supra note 13, at 1-60 (describing the etymology and use of the
term "empire" from the time of the Romans until Great Britain in 1700). By the 18th century,
"empire" to Britain was commerce. A commercial empire meant 'inexpensive power' which is
'unencumbered with the bulk immense of conquest' and, therefore, intrinsically superior to the 'huge
empires' of the past which 'fell self-crushed'." Id. at 82.
45. Id. at 82-83.
46. Id. at 74.
47. Id. at 87.
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which the sovereign manages the people through law. Unlike the repub-
lic, the empire can tolerate intermediate associations between itself and
the people, as long as these associations do not detract from its power.48
The empire is a machine, "modelling the people into various orders," 49
with the orders subordinated and manipulated by the sovereign to
achieve the imperial object 5 -the preeminence and independence of the
imperial economic, political, and military system as a whole.
Given the empire's dependence on hierarchy and commerce, the
function and nature of property differs greatly from its role in the repub-
lic. In an empire, rules of property encourage and support commercial
and economic growth. Property is not absolute or equally distributed.
Rather, like anything else of value, property must be saleable and capable
of stirring economic activity.
Expansion is necessary to the physical survival of an empire. With-
out expansion, the empire will exhaust its resources and be forced to turn
to other nations for theirs. The empire's survival and success in ex-
panding are threatened by two related obstacles: external threats and un-
profitable expansion. Other nations may threaten the empire if they
control resources that the empire needs, or if they try to conquer the
resources that the empire holds. To overcome these external threats, the
empire must develop its military and commercial strength so that it can
acquire and secure necessary holdings. But expansion to unprofitable
markets and to areas that cannot be secured economically or militarily
can drain the strength of the empire. In expanding to new areas, the
empire must ensure that the economic advantage of securing the territory
justifies the expense of doing so.
The frontier, therefore, is a compelling force behind the empire. It
represents at once the promise of future expansion and development and
the threat of incomplete control. As long as there is a frontier, the em-
pire must expand to secure access to people, land, and resources. But
once the frontier is exhausted, the empire is vulnerable to economic de-
pendence on other nations because it no longer controls the resources
and labor that it needs to sustain itself. The empire, like the republic, is
faced with an impossible task: if the empire expands to unprofitable terri-
48. Interestingly, colonial self-government was not in principle destructive of empirical author-
ity. However, once the colonies pursued independence, their self-rule threatened Britain's authority,
R. KOEBNER, supra note 13, at 92-93.
49. Id. at 87. For example, British colonists were restrained in developing industries of their
own because the Empire relied on the colonies for raw materials and markets for British goods. Id. at
89-92.
50. J. PococK, supra note 10, at 53.
[Vol. 37
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tory, it exposes itself to the threat of commercial and military domination
by other nations; if the empire fails to expand, its established markets
will be exhausted and will not support its economic needs. The empire,
therefore, must manage its expansion in terms of costs and benefits.
Unlike the republic, the empire is not threatened by diversity and
inequality among its citizens.51 In fact, the empire depends on these qual-
ities. To operate as a machine, the empire must have people to fulfill a
variety of roles. Diverse citizens, located throughout the empire, fulfill
diverse economic functions within the imperial machine to achieve the
public good. The empire, therefore, unites and manages diverse people
through centralized management. A condition of this unity, however, is
acceptance of the function demanded by the empire, and identification,
as a people, with the goal of empire.5 2
Although republican values of independence, liberty, and par-
ticipatory government drove the fight for independence, the new nation
did not reject imperialism per se.53 Rather, the colonies rejected the role
and status to which Britain confined them, as well as the corruption and
luxury that Britain represented. 4 In the Constitution, the Founders
sought to combine both a republic and an empire in the federalist sys-
tem.55 Given its seemingly endless supply of land, the United States was
poised to become an expansive land-based republic. This potential for
territorial expansion afforded a check against the inevitable corruption of
commerce. 56 In founding the new nation, therefore, the United States
51. In the 18th century, one linguist described an empire as an "Etat vaste et compos6 de
plusieurs peuples" (A vast state composed of many peoples). Id. at 59-60.
52. For example, in the British Empire of the 18th century, the nation's status as an empire was
a source of national self-esteem in which all subjects fulfilling their roles shared. Id. at 79-81.
53. "An empire compatible with virtue was a concept very necessary to them [Americans] if
they were to accept themselves as what they were by the circumstances of their foundation and
prehistory." J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 511; see also G. WOOD, supra note, 11, at 42-43. For the
pre-Revolutionary views of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Edmund Burke, see R.
KOEBNER, supra note 13, at 105-18, 217-19, 224.
54. See R. KOEBNER, supra note 13, at 217; G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 43-45; and J. POCOCK,
supra note 10, at 507-08.
55. The reforms embodied in the Constitution
permitted the overcoming of the widely accepted limitation which enjoined republics to
be of finite size if they would escape corruption; the new federation could be both repub-
lic and empire, continental in its initial dimensions and capable of further expansion by
means of simple extensions of the federative principle, greatly surpassing the semimili-
tary complex of colonies and provinces which had extended the Roman hegemony.
J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 524.
56. As long as commerce did not predominate the land-based agrarian economy and society of
the republic, the republic could maintain its virtue while accomodating commerce. See id. at 532-35.
1988/89]
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sought to escape the finitude of the republics of history and the corrup-
tion and despotism of an empire.
III. COLONIAL AND EARLY FEDERAL INDIAN POLICIES
The federal judiciary did not address the legal status of Indian tribes
until the 1830s.17 But colonial and federal policies of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries established the framework within which In-
dian law would develop.
A. Tribal and Federal Rights to Territory
Colonial and early federal policies were based on the doctrine of
discovery. This doctrine, a product of Eurpoean imperialism, was the
rule of international law which resolved conflicting land claims of com-
peting imperial powers. It provided that the first European or "Chris-
tian" power to discover and settle land had a claim to that land against
subsequent European claims. This right of discovery was subject to the
indigenous peoples' right to occupy the land. Their right of occupancy
existed until extinguished by voluntary cession to or conquest by the dis-
covering sovereign. The right to extinguish indigenous occupancy rights
vested exclusively in the discovering sovereign."3 Britain's claims to terri-
tory in North America were based on the doctrine of discovery and
passed to the new government after the Revolution. Colonial and early
federal policies that followed the doctrine reflect the military and com-
mercial interests of an emerging empire.59
British and early federal claims were limited to areas within the se-
cure economic and military control of the government. This restriction
was embodied in Britain's Proclamation of 1763.60 The Proclamation
served two purposes: to protect British economic interests and to secure
British holdings against threats from the tribes. These aims were to be
achieved in two ways. First, the Proclamation restricted British subjects
to land east of the Appalachians. This kept colonists close to British mar-
kets and ensured that they would not manufacture their own goods, in
competition with British goods. In this way, Britain enforced the colo-
57. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see also infra notes 71-102 and accompanying text.
58. See Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United
States, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 637, 644-45 (1978) (explaining European roots of discovery doctrine).
59. F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE
AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, at 26-40, 13-16 (1962).
60. Id. at 13. The Proclamation of 1763 is printed in DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF CANADA, 1759-1791, at 163-68 (A. Short & Doughty eds. 2d ed. 1918).
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nies' role as markets for British goods and sources of raw materials for
British manufacturers.61 Second, the Proclamation established a licens-
ing system to regulate commercial and land transactions with the Indians
in "Indian Country." Fraudulent land transactions and corrupt trading
practices of certain colonists had antagonized the tribes. Because Britain
did not have resources to defend the colonies against the tribes, the
crown sought to reduce conflicts by regulating white contacts with the
tribes. If conflicts were reduced, the military power needed to protect the
white settlers also could be reduced.62
After the Revolution, the United States had to contend with the
tribes as former wartime enemies. Although the tribes fought for the los-
ing side, they had not been conquered and were not subject completely to
the control of the federal government. 63 They continued to present a very
real threat to the federal government's control of the territory it claimed.
Like Britain, the United States sought to encourage tribal passivity
through trade and by controlling white contacts with the tribes. These
goals were embodied in the Trade and Intercourse Acts.'
The imperial values underlying the doctrine of discovery and the
Trade and Intercourse Acts continued to define the doctrinal relationship
of the tribes and the federal government during the first half of the nine-
teenth century. In Johnson v. McIntosh,65 decided in 1823, the Supreme
Court confronted for the first time the conflict between tribal and federal
property rights. Johnson claimed certain land through a devise from his
61. F. PRUCHA, supra note 59, at 14, 16. Lord Egremont, Secretary of State for the Southern
Department, first proposed an Indian boundary line:
It might also be necessary to fix upon some Line for a Western Boundary to our ancient
provinces, beyond which our People should not at present be permitted to settle, hence
as their Numbers increased, they would emigrate to Nova Scotia, or to the provinces on
the Southern Frontier, where they would be usefull to their Mother Country, instead of
planting themselves in the Heart of America, out of the reach of Government, and
where, from the Difficulty of procuring European Commodities, they would be com-
pelled to commence Manufacturs [sic] to the infinite prejudice of Britain.
Id. at 16.
62. Id. at 12-20.
63. The United States treated the tribes as if they had been conquered in the first treaties after
the war. The treaties were not negotiated and the United States refused to compensate the tribes for
losses. The tribes objected to such treatment, believing that the colonies had desired peace. The tribes
themselves did not believe they had been conquered. Id. at 26-34.
64. Id. at 36-45. The first Trade and Intercourse Act was passed in 1790. Act to Regulate Trade
and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 55, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). It was based on the principles of
the Proclamation of 1763: all who traded with the Indians must be licensed; only the federal govern-
ment could purchase land from the tribes; acts of whites against Indians in Indian Country were
made federal crimes. F. PRUCHA, supra note 59, at 45-46.
65. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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father, who had received the land from the Piankeshaw and Illinois In-
dian nations. McIntosh claimed the same land by grants from the federal
government. The government's rights were secured by a grant from the
same tribes, made after the grants to Johnson's father. Marshall, writing
for a unanimous court, framed this issue as "the power of Indians to give,
and of private individuals to receive, a title, which can be sustained in the
courts of this country."66 He opened his opinion by declaring that
it will be necessary, in pursuing this inquiry, to examine, not simply those
principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed
on the mind of his creature man, and which are admitted to regulate, in a
great degree, the rights of civilized nations, whose perfect independence is
acknowledged; but those principles also which our own government had
adopted in the particular case, and given as the rule for our decision.
By that passage, Marshall established that tribal property rights de-
pended on international law, as well as domestic rules of property.
After presenting an exhaustive history of the doctrine of discovery
and establishing that the United States accepted its principles,68 Marshall
held the grants from the Indian nations to the elder Johnson invalid be-
cause discovery gave the sovereign the exclusive right to acquire Indian
title.6 9 Responding to arguments that the tribes retained full rights to
their territory under rules of international law governing the relations
between conquered people and conquering nations, Marshall explained
that domestic law did not follow those rules and that the circumstances
of the tribes and the interests of the nation justified exception:
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the
forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the coun-
try a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible be-
cause they were as brave and high-spirited as they were fierce, and were
ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.
That law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the rela-
tions between the conqueror and conquered, was incapable of application to
a people under such circumstances. The resort to some new and different
rule; better adapted to the actual state of things, was unavoidable.
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been as-
serted in the first instance, and afterward sustained; if a country has been
66. Id. at 572.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 574-88.
69. Id. at 604-05.
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acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the commu-
nity originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be ques-
tioned. So too, with respect to the concommitant principle, that the Indian
inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, in-
deed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed
incapable of transferring the absolute title to others. However this restric-
tion may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations,
yet, if it be indispensible to that system under which the country has been
settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may,
perhaps, be support by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts
of justice.70
Marshall's opinion enforced three sets of imperial values. First, by
applying the doctrine of discovery, he supported its underlying goal,
namely expanding the domain of the discovering sovereign. Second, by
applying domestic rather than international law, Marshall asserted that
the federal government was free to govern the tribes to serve its own
interests. By respecting the tribes' right to occupy their land, the federal
sovereign could encourage the tribes to remain at peace; by restricting
the tribes' right to convey that land to anyone other than the federal
sovereign, the government could maintain control over unsettled terri-
tory. Finally, Marshall's opinion enforced the principle of de facto
power. He defined the tribe's property rights, not by abstract principles,
but by the rules that the federal government applied in fact in acquiring
Indian territory. The correctness of these rules derived from their asser-
tion, but more importantly from their exercise. As in an empire, the do-
mestic rules of the federal sovereign were determined by its interests and
its power. Economic, territorial, and military interests defined the aim of
domestic law, but the nation's strength and capacity to apply the law
determined its extent.
B. Tribal, Federal, and State Sovereignty
The imperial nature of the tribes' relationship with the federal gov-
ernment was developed further in Marshall's opinions in Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia,71 decided in 1831, and Worcester v. Georgia,7" decided
one year later. In these cases, also known as the Cherokee Cases, the
Court developed its first comprehensive definition of the relationships be-
tween the states, the tribes, and the federal government. Although Mar-
shall wrote the majority opinions, the opinions of the other justices also
70. Id. at 590-92.
71. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
72. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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are important because they reflect the force of republican and imperial
values and the variety of forms that those values took.
In the Cherokee Cases, the Cherokee and the state of Georgia both
claimed land within the state's borders. Both based their claims on their
inherent sovereignty, as well as agreements with the federal government.
By two treaties signed late in the eighteenth century, the United States
and the Cherokee set the boundaries between the two nations.73 The
United States guaranteed to the Cherokee their territory and undertook
an assimilation program so "[t]hat the Cherokee nation might be led to a
greater degree of civilization, and to become herdsmen and cultivators,
instead of remaining in a state of hunters."'7 4 Approximately five million
acres of the land guaranteed to the tribe lay within the borders of Geor-
gia.75 In 1802 the federal government agreed with Georgia that it would
extinguish Indian title to land within the state in exchange for certain
land in western Georgia. Until the federal government extinguished In-
dian title, the state and white settlers were prohibited from encroaching
on Cherokee land.7 6 In entering this agreement, the federal government
assumed that the Cherokee would sell their land voluntarily at about the
same rate that white settlers demanded it.77
This assumption proved false. By the 1820s the government's assim-
ilation program had worked. Many Cherokee had become herdsmen and
farmers and were tied to their land.78 The unsettled lands beyond the
Mississippi River were no more appealing to the Cherokee than to the
white settlers who demanded their removal.79 Georgia pressed the federal
government to fulfill its promise and remove the Cherokee from the state.
73. Treaty at Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, art. 4, 7 Stat. 18, 19, and Treaty of Holston, July 2,
1791, 7 Stat. 39.
74. Treaty of Holston, art. 14, 7 Stat. at 41.
75. Berman, supra note 58, at 656.
76. Georgia Cession, April 26, 1802, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 126
(1832); see also, Berman, supra note 58, at 656 (quoting 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 729 (1926)).
77. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500,
503 (1969).
78. Id.
79. The Cherokee stated, as reported in the case summary,
that they are fully satisfied with the country they possess; the climate is salubrious; it is
convenient for commerce and intercourse; it contains schools, in which they can obtain
teachers from the neighboring states, and places for the worship of God, where Christi-
anity is taught by missionaries and pastors easily supplied from the United States....
Little is known of the country west of the Mississippi; and if accepted, the bill asserts it
will be the grave not only of their civilization and Christianity, but of the nation itself.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 9.
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The Cherokee responded by asserting their sovereignty and independence
against both the state of Georgia and the United States.8' Georgia, in
turn, asserted its sovereignty over the Cherokee by, among other things,
establishing county governments in Cherokee territory, regulating non-
Indian contact with the tribe, declaring tribal laws and customs null and
void, and extending Georgia law into Cherokee territory., 1 The state,
supported by Jacksonian Democrats in Congress and the Executive, de-
nied federal authority to intervene and maintained that the tribe could
not exist as a sovereign within the borders of Georgia.
The Cherokee turned to the Supreme Court to uphold their sover-
eign rights. The tribe's complaint asserted its complete "sovereignty and
independence," as recognized in United States treaties with the tribe,82
and denied the doctrine of discovery, claiming absolute title derived from
"the Great Spirit, who is the common father of the human family, and to
whom the whole earth belongs. '83 The tribe argued that Georgia was
precluded from governing Cherokee territory by its treaties with the fed-
eral government, which were the "supreme law of the land" under article
VI of the Constitution, and by article I of the Constitution, which vested
in the federal government exclusive power to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes.8 4
The Court's opinions in the Cherokee Cases analyzed tribal, state,
and federal sovereign relationships in two steps. First, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia defined the legal relationship between the tribes and the federal
government. Second, Worcester v. Georgia defined the relationships be-
tween the Cherokee and the state of Georgia, and the state of Georgia
and the federal government.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall dismissed the Cherokee's
claim on jurisdictional grounds because the tribe did not constitute a
"foreign state" for purposes of article III of the Constitution.85 Marshall
80. Berman, supra note 58, at 657 (quoting F. PRUCHA, supra note 59, at 231).
81. Burke, supra note 77, at 503.
82. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 5.
83. Id. at 3.
84. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
85. Article III of the Constitution provides in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more
States;- between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming lands under the grants of different
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acknowledged the tribe was a "state" because the United States had rec-
ognized through treaties that the Cherokee Nation was "as a people ca-
pable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible
in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for
any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any
individual of their community." 6 But Marshall denied that the Cherokee
was foreign because it was located within territory belonging to the
United States. He wrote:
The Indian territory is admitted to compose a part of the United
States. In all our maps, geographical treatises, histories, and laws, it is so
considered....
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well by our-
selves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the
United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political
connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our terri-
tory, and an act of hostility.87
Marshall compromised. The tribes were states, but not foreign. They
were
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert
title independent of their will which must take effect in point of possession
when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, they are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian.88
Marshall's opinion reflects imperial values in its definition of the
federal-tribal relationship. First, he determined that the Cherokee was a
state based on imperial criteria: the tribe's capacity to conduct war
against the United States, and to control and assume repsonsibility for its
members. Like the empire, the federal sovereign respected the tribe's de
facto power. Marshall used the same idea of de facto power to conclude
the the Cherokee Nation was not foreign to the United States. Because
all nations recognized and respected the United States' sovereignty over
the Cherokee, the United States enjoyed de facto control over the tribe,
relative to foreign nations. Finally, Marshall's opinion reflects the force
of imperial principles in the assumption that the federal sovereign could
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or
Subjects.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
86. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
87. Id. at 17-18.
88. Id. at 17.
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incorporate the Cherokee as a distinct state, even though its members
differed from citizens of the United States. Like the empire, the federal
sovereign could extend its sovereignty over another very different power.
Justice Johnson concurred with Marshall's conclusion that the
Court lacked jurisdiction. But he rejected Marshall's conclusion that the
Cherokee Nation was a state. He wrote:
I cannot but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the applicabil-
ity of the epithet state, to a people so low in the grade of organized society
as our own Indian tribes most generally are.
[The Indian tribes] never have been recognized as holding sovereignty over
the territory they occupy. It is in vain now to inquire into the sufficiency of
the principle, that discovery gave the right of dominion over the country
discovered.... When the eastern coast of this continent, and especially the
part we inhabit, was discovered, finding it occupied by a race of hunters,
connected in society by scarcely a semblance of organic government the
right was extended to the absolute appropriation of the territory, the annex-
ation of it to the domain of the discoverer.89
In Johnson's view the Cherokee Nation was not a state because of the
character of the people. They were not settled landowners, organized as
people in a republic should be. Johnson's definition of "state," therefore,
relied in part on republican values concerning the character of citizens
and the organization of society.
Justice Baldwin's concurrence offers another view of how republican
and imperial imagery informed the justices' visions of sovereignty and
statehood. Baldwin upheld federal assertion of the "right of soil, sover-
eignty, and jurisdiction, in full dominion" in tribal lands, on which the
tribes are "occupant, of allotted hunting grounds."90 But, invoking val-
ues of the republic, he denied that the Cherokee could claim sovereignty
within the sovereignty of Georgia.
[Georgia's] jurisdiction over the territory in question is as supreme as that
of congress over what the nation has aquired by cession from the states or
treaties with foreign powers .... Within [Georgia's] boundaries there can
be no other nation, community, or sovereign power, which this department
can judicially recognize as a foreign state, capable of demanding or claiming
our interposition, so as to enable them to exercise a jurisdiction incompati-
ble with a sovereignty in Georgia .... 91
Baldwin, therefore, viewed the federal sovereign as an empire, capable of
89. Id. at 21-22.
90. Id. at 40.
91. Id. at 47.
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accommodating the states as sovereigns, and the tribes as distinct com-
munities of hunters. He viewed the states as republics, incapable of toler-
ating distinct communities within their borders.
Justice Thompson wrote the only dissenting opinion. In concluding
that the Cherokee was a foreign state, he invoked a republican definition
of sovereignty.
The terms state and nation ... imply a body of men, united together,
to procure their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union. Such
a society has its affairs and interests to manage; it deliberates, and takes
resolutions in common, and thus becomes a moral person, having an under-
standing and a will peculiar to itself, and is susceptible of obligations and
laws. Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and
who, before the establishment of civil societies, live together in the state of
nature, nations or sovereign states; are to be considered as so many free
persons, living together in a state of nature. Every nation that governs itself,
under what form soever, without any dependence on a foreign power, is a
sovereign state. Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other
state.
92
Despite the effect of the doctrine of discovery, which necessarily brought
the tribes within the territory of the United States, Thompson held that
the Cherokee was foreign because
[i]t is the political relation in which one government or country stands to
another, which constitutes it foreign to the other. The Cherokee territory
being within the chartered limits of Georgia, does not affect the ques-
tion .... It may be inconvenient to the state, and very desirable, that the
Cherokees should be removed; but it does not at all affect the political rela-
tion between Georgia and those Indians.93
The Cherokee dispute with Georgia returned to the Court in
Worcester v. Georgia. Worcester, a citizen of Vermont, was a missionary
who had lived among the Cherokee and been arrested under one of the
Georgia statutes regulating white contact with the tribe.94 Jurisdiction of
the Court was founded on diversity of citizenship. In practical terms, the
question before the Court was whether Georgia possessed sovereign au-
thority over the Cherokee. Marshall defined the question as, "the validity
of the treaties made by the United States with the Cherokee Indians" and
"the validity of a statute of the state of Georgia, 'on the ground of its
being repugnant to the constitution, treaties and laws of the United
92. Id. at 52-53 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 55.
94. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 537-38; see also Burke, supra note 77, at 519.
[Vol. 37
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
States .... .' " Marshall reaffirmed first federal jurisdiction over tribal
territory through the doctrine of discovery,96 and then found that by
treaties with the tribe, "the United States contemplate[s] the Indian terri-
tory as completely separated from that of the states ."97 Marshall
concluded by writing:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Geor-
gia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity
with treaties, and with the acts of congress.
98
The way in which Marshall framed the issue in the case- whether
Georgia violated federal law and the Constitution- determined his anal-
ysis. Because federal treaties recognized Cherokee sovereignty and guar-
anteed to the Nation its land, Georgia's acts were "repugnant to the
constitution, treaties and laws, of the United States."9 9 Marshall did not
base the tribe's sovereignty on its political capacity. Rather, Cherokee
sovereignty was the law of the federal sovereign. Marshall's opinion sug-
gests that the federal sovereign, like the empire, defines the rights and
status of its holdings.
Justice McLean entered a concurring opinion that also demonstrates
the imperial dimensions of federal sovereignty, as well as the republican
nature of state sovereignty. McLean upheld the Cherokee's right to self-
government simply because it was the policy of the federal government to
do so. Relying on the notion that sovereignty constituted de facto control
over territory, McLean wrote:
A state claims the right of sovereignty, commensurate with her territory; as
the United States claim it, in their proper sphere, to the extent of the federal
limits. This right or power, in some cases, may be exercised, but not in
others. Should a hostile force invade the country, at its most remote bound-
ary, it would become the duty of the general government to expel the invad-
ers. But it would violate the solemn compacts with the Indians, without
cause, to dispossess them of rights which they possess by nature, and have
been uniformly acknowledged by the federal government.1°°
As long as the tribes did not offer the federal sovereign "cause" to deny
95. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 541.
96. Id. at 543-49 (explaining the history of European discovery of North America and the de-
scent of American claims from those of Britain).
97. Id. at 557.
98. Id. at 561.
99. Id. at 562-63.
100. Id. at 591.
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their natural rights, territorial and treaty rights would be respected. Ulti-
mately, however, tribal rights were a matter of federal policy, not right.
The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians, within a state,
is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary .... It is a question, not of
abstract right, but of public policy .... [A] sound national policy does re-
quire that the Indian tribes within our states should exchange their territo-
ries, upon equitable principles, or, eventually, consent to become
amalgamated in our political communities. 101
McLean suggested that amalgamation of the tribes would serve the polit-
ical welfare of the state, presumably by supporting a homogeneous and
unified populace, because the
existence [of a tribe] within a state, as a separate and independent commu-
nity, may seriously embarrass or obstruct the operation of the state laws. If,
therefore, it would be inconsistent with the political welfare of the states,
and the social advance of their citizens, that an independent and permanent
power should exist within their limits, this power must give way to the
greater power which surrounds it, or seek its exercise beyond the sphere of
state authority.10 2
Though Marshall's opinion was an apparent victory for the Chero-
kee, it offered the tribe no basis for protection from hostile federal poli-
cies that arose throughout the remainder of the century. Tribal
sovereignty, according to Marshall, necessarily depended on an act of
recognition by the federal sovereign. The converse of this power to recog-
nize and protect tribal sovereignty was the power to deny and destroy it.
Despite Marshall's opinions upholding the tribes' right to self-gov-
ernance and territorial integrity, President Andrew Jackson refused to
enforce them.103 Jackson maintained that the tribes within states were
subject to the states' sovereignty, and that the federal government had no
authority to interfere. 1" The President recognized the tribes' right to
self-government, but believed that it could be exercised only outside of
state territory.10 5 In 1830 Congress passed the Removal Bill 10 6 to enforce
this position.
101. Id. at 593.
102. Id. at 594.
103. Upon learning of the Court's opinion, President Jackson supposedly responded, "John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." Burke, supra note 77, at 524-25.
104. Id. at 504.
105. Consistent with his support of states rights and westward expansion, Jackson believed that
the only solution for the tribes was to move outside of the states within which they resided. "The
Cherokees had no right to set up an independent nation within the limits of Georgia, and the Presi-
dent had no authority to interfere with the internal legislation of one of the states of the Union." Id.
106. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
[Vol. 37
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Under the Removal Bill, the President, without consulting the Sen-
ate, could make treaties with the tribes to remove them from land within
states to unsettled land west of the Mississippi River. Recognizing the
disparate values of the land ceded and the land gained by the tribes, the
federal government promised to compensate the tribes with annuity pay-
ments. The treaties offered also federal money and support to "cause"
the tribes' removal.'0 7 In many treaties, the tribes conceded that they
depended on the federal government for protection and were subject to
its jurisdiction. In exchange, the United States guaranteed the tribes'
rights to self-government."0 8 This policy assumed the tribes removed to
new territory would become sufficiently civilized to live among white set-
tlers by the time the country expanded to the Indian territory. Ulti-
mately, the Removal Policy sought to destroy the tribes as sovereigns
and assimilate tribal members.10 9
The Removal Policy and the judicial decisions of the period reflect
the imperial values underlying Marshall's opinions in the Cherokee
Cases. The Removal Bill vested in the President extensive power to man-
age the tribes according to the land and resource needs of the nation.
Furthermore, in enforcing the Removal Policy, the judiciary identified
tribal sovereignty so closely with federal policy that tribal rights de-
pended entirely on the terms of the treaties effecting their removal. But
during this same period, republican values defined the relationship of the
tribes and individual tribal members to the states. Both Congress and the
president, in enacting and applying the Removal Bill, and the courts, in
enforcing it, viewed the states as republics that could not tolerate the
tribes and individual tribal members.
This view of the states is reflected in United States v. Cisna,110 de-
cided by a federal circuit court in 1835. Cisna, an Indian, was charged
107. For example, the Treaty with the Seneca and Shawnee, 7 Stat. 351 (1831), contained the
following grant in article II:
In consideration of the cessions stipulated in the foregoing article, the United States
agree to cause the said band of Senecas and Shawnees, consisting of about three hundred
souls, to be removed in a convenient and suitable manner to the western side of the
Mississippi River, and will grant by patent, in fee simple to them and their heirs forever,
as long as they shall exist as a nation and remain on the same, a tract of land...
Id. at 352. In article VIII, the United States promised to sell the land vacated by the tribe to the
public and invest the proceeds in a trust fund, the return of which in part, was to be distributed to
the tribe. Id. at 352-53.
108. See e.g., Treaty with the Choctaws, 1830, arts. IV-V, 7 Stat. 333-34 (1830).
109. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 50-51
(1980).
110. 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio 1835) (No. 14,795).
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with stealing a horse on the Wyandott reservation in Ohio. The federal
government claimed jurisdiction over the crime under the Trade and In-
tercourse Act of 1802.111 Cisna and the state challenged the jurisdiction
of the federal court, claiming that the Trade and Intercourse Act, as ap-
plied to the Wyandott, infringed the state's sovereignty. They reasoned
that, because the tribe was located within the state and tribal members
interacted constantly and successfully with whites, the tribe had become
part of the state and subject to its jurisdiction and sovereignty.
The Court agreed, holding that the Act did not apply because the
Wyandott, and Cisna in particular, were so civilized that they had be-
come part of the state polity. In its reasoning, the Court disclosed its
visions of federal and state sovereignties:
[C]ertain political relations exist growing out of treaties between the federal
government and almost every distinct tribe of Indians within our national
limits. These relations may be extended by treaties as far as a sound policy,
in the discretion of the treaty making power shall admit, where the Indians
reside beyond the limits of a state; but within those limits neither the treaty
making power nor the legislative power can be exercised so as to abridge
the rights of a state.
Congress can exercise no power on this subject, beyond that of regulat-
ing commerce with the Indian tribes.... [Such regulations] shall preserve
those tribes from an indiscriminate commercial intercourse with our own
citizens; such is their inferiority in the business of commerce while in an
uncivilized state, that their interests would be sacrificed, if left to an un-
restricted intercourse." 12
The Court's view of the state as a republic is reflected in its use of
images of property, independence, and the tribe's similarity to white peo-
ple to support its conclusion that the tribe was subject to state
jurisdiction.
The Wyandotts have made rapid advances in the arts of civilization. Many
of them are very intelligent; their farms are well improved and they gener-
ally live in good houses. They own property of almost every kind, and enjoy
the comforts of life in as high a degree as many of their white neighbors.
[The Trade and Intercourse Acts] are wholly unsuited to the condition of
the Wyandott tribe, and it would be impossible to give them a practical
operation.1
13
State authority over the tribes depended on the actual similarity of
tribal members to the citizens of the state. Like the republic, the state
111. 2 Stat. 139 (1802).




could incorporate tribal members who shared the customs, habits, and
values of the original polity. But, as long as tribal members remained
uncivilized, they were not a part of the state polity and were subject to
the sovereign control of the federal government. The federal government,
like the empire, could incorporate the tribes and manage them, regard-
less of their degree of civilization.
C. Summary
Early Indian law cases demonstrate that the judiciary invoked
images of the empire and the republic to define the rights and relation-
ships of the tribes, the federal government, and the states. Federal power
over the tribes was imperial. It derived from the fact of its exercise, as
recognized in Johnson v. McIntosh, and from treaties with the tribes, as
recognized in the Cherokee Cases. As Cisna demonstrates, the judiciary
viewed the states as republics, unable to incorporate or govern tribal
members and tribes unless they were similar to the residents of the states.
This structure supported the nation's territorial expansion by vesting in
the federal government exclusive power to determine tribal rights to sov-
ereignty, land, and resources, and to limit or deny those rights as the
interests of the developing empire demanded.
IV. FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 1860-1934
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the United States began to
realize its dream of a continental empire. Early transportation and com-
munication technologies tied the nation together physically; developing
national corporations and industries tied the nation together economi-
cally; the Union's victory in the Civil War maintained the nation politi-
cally. 1 14 As economic and political issues developed on a national rather
than local level, the federal government expanded to address those issues
inappropriate for state-by-state regulation.l1 I Realization of a continental
empire signalled the exhaustion of the frontier. Like an empire, the
United States needed to expand its markets to support itself. In search of
new markets, the United States pursued an extra-continental commercial
empire.'16 But this overseas expansion depended on a strong economic
114. For accounts of the economic and social changes during the second half of the 19th cen-
tury, see W. LAFEBER, THE NEW EMPIRE: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN EXPANSION,
1860-1898 (1963) and R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
115. R. WIEBE, supra note 114, at 185-89.
116. W. LAFEBER, supra note 114.
Two important features distinguished [the new empire) from the old. First, with the
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and political base at home.11 7 As the empire developed, capital and eco-
nomic and political power became consolidated in national institutions
such as the federal government, large corporations, and political interest
groups. These new institutions threatened the republican values of local
autonomy, equality, and liberty on which domestic strength and stability
depended.11 To maintain those values, the government imposed regula-
tions to ensure competition in the marketplace and to stablize the econ-
omy and society. 19 But with the supply of land dwindling, federal power
growing, and the economy shifting from agriculture to industry and com-
merce, 1 0 classical republican notions of land-based independence and
governance no longer applied. By the twentieth century, classical values
of independence and governance gave way to values of wealth, invest-
ment, and federal government control that were consistent with the new
economy and system of government.
This new world changed the relationship between the states and fed-
eral government, and the judiciary's visions of those sovereignties. Fed-
eral power was viewed in increasingly imperial terms as it expanded to
address more issues. States were losing the absolute power characteristic
completion of the continental conquest Americans moved with increasing authority into
such extracontinental areas as Hawaii, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Second, the
form of expansion changed. Instead of searching for farming, mineral, or grazing lands,
Americans sought foreign markets for agricultural staples or industrial goods.
Id. at 1.
When in the 1880s many Americans feared that [the Western] frontier was closing, they
reacted in the classic manner of searching farther west for new frontiers, though primar-
ily of a commercial, not landed nature. This swept them into the Pacific and Asiatic area
and hence into one of the maelstroms of world power politics.
Id. at 11.
117. To support international commercial expansion, American intellectual leaders
demanded a stable and prosperous American continent to serve as a springboard for
conquests beyond the seas .... On the one hand, they wanted a new empire to solve
domestic problems of crisis proportions. On the other hand, they realized that only a
nation which was spiritually, economically, and politically sound could create and main-
tain such an empire.
Id. at 101.
118. Id. at 45-47. Progressives were concerned with controlling the excesses of urbanization and
industrialization, and with the decline of community autonomy:
The sweep of reform represented by these [early] movements sought to preserve indi-
vidualism and democracy, as their adherents understood the terms, by protecting
America's communities.... [Their] proposal[s] attempted to place power in the hands of
small, familiar groups under the dual assumptions that it had once resided there and that
a good society required its return.
R. WIEBE, supra note 114, at 74.
119. W. LAFEBER supra note 114, at 219-23.
120. Id. at 11-13.
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of republics, as federal authority reached into traditional state matters.
But republican values persisted to maintain the political stability of the
nation.
Developments in Indian law during this time reflect these changes.
The federal government assumed exclusive authority over the tribes and
their members, even when they were located within states. But the tribes
were not excluded from state jurisdiction because of their republican in-
capacity, as they had been under the Removal Policy. Rather, they were
excluded because under federal law, they were declared to be a federal
matter. Yet, ironically, the judiciary invoked republican rhetoric to ex-
clude tribes and tribal members from the federal political community.
During this period the federal government pursued two policies to
assimilate the tribes and their members. First, in the 1840s and 1850s,
the government undertook the Reservation Policy.121 Through a series of
treaties with various tribes, the federal government created reservations
to which the tribes were confined by law. These reservations worked as
institutions for assimilating the Indians by rewarding "civilized" behav-
ior and outlawing tribal practices and customs.12 2 Dissatisfied with the
progress of the Indians under the Reservation Policy, the government
adopted the General Allotment Act in 1886.123 This Act authorized the
President to allot reservations into private lots124 and to declare as citi-
zens those Indians receiving allotments. 25 Allotted lands were held in
trust by the federal government for a period of years, during which time
tribal members were expected to learn how to manage and maintain their
new private property.1 26 Both the Reservation and Allotment Policies
supported the overseas empire and domestic stability by making more
land available for white settlement, assimilating Indians into the national
economic and political systems, and eliminating the social and political
unrest associated with the tribes by confining the tribes and controlling
their contacts with whites.
These policies and the judicial decisions made while they were in
force reflect an interesting mix of republican and imperial values and
demonstrate how republican principles actually supported and strength-
121. See Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal Problems, in AMERICAN
INDIANS AND THE LAW 17 (L. Rosen ed. 1976).
122. Id. at 12, 17.
123. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, cl. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1982)).
124. Id. § 1, at 388.
125. Id. § 6, at 390.
126. Id. § 5, at 389.
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ened the imperial character of the federal sovereign. Under the Reserva-
tion Policy, republican principles of land-based independence and
capacity continued to determine an Indian's civil status. Under the Allot-
ment Act, citizenship, or membership in the polity, was tied directly to
ownership of land. Private property was to be the instrument that would
convert tribal members into independent citizens prepared to participate
in white society. But the opinions and policies of this period reflect also
principles of the empire. First, the status of the tribes and their members
depended entirely on the laws of the federal sovereign. Second, under the
Allotment Act, the federal government managed the tribes and their re-
sources, as an empire would, to serve its own national policy goals.
Third, in exercising its protective authority over tribal resources, the fed-
eral government enforced imperial economic values to generate income
and wealth for the tribes. By the early twentieth century, tribal land and
resources were managed as commodities and investments, not as the
source of republican independence and virtue contemplated under the
Allotment Act. Finally, both policies extended federal power into Indian
territory within states. The federal sovereign aggrandized its centralized
power over land, resources, and people at the expense of state power.
Ironically, the judiciary used republican principles to support imperial
power by using the tribes' dependency to justify federal authority over
them.
A. Treaties and Citizenship
The treaties of the Reservation Period expanded federal control and
governance of Indian country through educational programs, Indian
agents, and military supervision. In 1871, Congress decreed that the
tribes no longer were sovereign nations by declaring "[t]hat hereafter no
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty." '27 Instead Con-
gress could legislate directly for the tribes. Although the tribes continued
to exist and were recognized under federal law, they did not represent
sovereign nations. Rather, the tribes were self-governing communities,
distinguished by their collective dependence and incapacity.
United States v. Tobacco Factory,28 called Cherokee Tobacco 29 on
127. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 71-88
(1982)).
128. 28 F. Cas. 195 (D.C.W.D. Ark. 1870) (No. 16,528).
129. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
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appeal to the Supreme Court in 1870, demonstrates that the courts
viewed federal power in increasingly imperial terms. These decisions con-
cerned a conflict between an Indian treaty and a later congressional act.
The Internal Revenue Act of 1868130 taxed alcohol, tobacco, and tobacco
products "produced anywhere within the exterior boundaries of the
United States." 13' But the federal government had exempted Cherokee
agriculture and industry from federal taxation in an earlier treaty.
13 2
Based on that treaty, a member of the tribe challenged the validity of
taxes imposed on activities within Cherokee territory.
Both courts held the tax applied to the Cherokee despite the promise
of the treaty. The Supreme Court's opinion analyzed the Cherokee's
claim in two steps. First, it held that Indian territory indisputably was
within the territorial limits of the United States and within the terms of
the Act.' 33 Second, it analyzed whether the treaty survived the revenue
legislation. The Court's analysis reveals an imperial view that the sanc-
tity of a treaty commitment depends on whether, in the sovereign's judg-
ment, the treaty would serve its interests.
Treaties with Indian nations within the jurisdiction of the United States,
whatever considerations of humanity and good faith may be involved and
require their faithful observance, cannot be more obligatory [than treaties
with other entities]. They have no higher sanctity; and no greater inviolabil-
ity or immunity from legislative invasion can be claimed for them. The con-
sequences in all such cases give rise to questions which must be met by the
political department of the government. They are beyond the sphere of judi-
cial cognizance. In the case under consideration the act of Congress must
prevail as if the treaty were not an element to be considered. If a wrong has
been done the power of redress is with Congress, not with the judiciary, and
that body, upon being applied to, it is to be presumed, will promptly give
the proper relief.13
The opinion of the district court, affirmed by the Supreme Court,
offers another view of imperial values underlying the federal-tribal
relationship:
It must be confessed that the language of some of these treaties is well cal-
culated to flatter the pride of the Indian tribes, and give them a very errone-
ous notion of the actual legal relation they sustain to the national
government.... The power of the national government over the Indian
tribes and the territory occupied by them, within the constitutional limits of
130. Internal Revenue Act of 1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat. 125.
131. Id. § 107, at 167.
132. Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, July 19, 1866, art. 10, 14 Stat. 799, 801.
133. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 619.
134. Id. at 621.
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municipal legislation is plenary. To what extent this power will be exercised
rests in the sound discretion of congress, limited only by those considera-
tions of policy and humanity that have always marked the action of the
government in its treatment of these people. 135
Cherokee Tobacco strengthened the ability of the federal govern-
ment to manage the tribes as it wished. Like an empire, the government
was not bound by treaties that did not serve its interests and could nullify
them with legislation. The 1871 Act, which declared that the United
States would no longer conduct treaty relations with the tribes, affirmed
this power with positive legislation. 136 Control of the tribes was now
complete under federal law. The federal sovereign could govern the tribes
according to its policy agenda, free from concern about treaties and tribal
consent.
Despite the strength of imperial ideology in these opinions, federal
courts still invoked visions of the republic to define the relationship of the
federal sovereign to the tribes and their members. In a series of cases
decided in the 1870s and 1880s, the judiciary articulated the relationship
of the tribes and their members to the federal government in republican
terms of independence and capacity. These opinions reveal that the judi-
ciary viewed the federal sovereign as both an empire and a republic. Like
an empire, the federal sovereign incorporated and governed the tribes as
distinct communities, regardless of their members' independence or de-
gree of civilization. But like a republic, the federal sovereign rejected the
tribes and their members as part of the federal body politic.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Exparte Crow Dog 1 37 in 1883 and
Elk v. Wilkins1 38 in 1884 exposed these republican dimensions of the
federal sovereign. Crow Dog involved a conflict between federal and tribal
jurisdiction over an intra-tribal crime committed within Indian territory.
The Court's opinion denying federal criminal jurisdiction reflects the
strength of republican imagery in defining federal authority:
[The law] is sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over the mem-
bers of a community separated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a
free though savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to im-
pose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown code, and to
subject them to the responsibilities of civil conduct, according to rules and
penalties of which they could have no previous warning; which judges them
by a standard made by others and not for them, which takes no account of
135. 28 F. Cas. at 196.
136. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
137. 109 U.S. 559.
138. 112 U.S. 94.
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the conditions which should except them from its exactions, and makes no
allowance for their inability to understand it. It tries them, not by their
peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by
superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social state of which
they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions
of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of
their savage nature; one which measures the red man's revenge by the max-
ims of the white man's morality.
1 39
Justice Matthews invoked republican rhetoric to define the relationship
of tribal members to the federal sovereign also:
[Tribal members] were ... to be subject to the laws of the United States, not
in the sense of citizens, but, as they had always been, as wards subject to a
guardian; not as individuals, constituted members of the political commu-
nity of the United States, with a voice in the selection of representatives and
the framing of the laws, but as a dependent community who were in a state
of pupilage, advancing from the condition of a savage tribe to that of a
people who, through the discipline of labor and by education, it was hoped
might become a self-supporting and self-governed society.
1 40
The Court denied that the federal sovereign had criminal jurisdiction
over intra-tribal crimes committed in tribal territory because the Indians
were different from white people and could not live under the same laws.
They differed from the members of white society, because they were de-
pendent and uneducated.
Elk v. Wilkins considered whether Indians were citizens of the
United States. 14 1 The Court used rhetoric similar to that in Crow Dog to
deny that Indians born into a tribe could become citizens without an Act
of Congress. John Elk was born into a tribe, but he had "severed his
tribal relation to the Indian tribes, and fully and completely surrendered
himself to the jurisdiction of the United States."14 2 He claimed that by
leaving his tribe and living as a white person, he had become a citizen
and was entitled to vote under the fifteenth amendment.
14 3
The Court considered first whether birth into an Indian tribe consti-
tuted birth "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States, as the four-
139. 109 U.s. at 571.
140. Id. at 568-69.
141. 112 U.S. 94; see also McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161 (D.C.D. Or. 1871) (No. 8,840);
United States v. Elm, 25 F. Cas. 1006 (D.C.N.D. N.Y. 1877) (No. 15,048) (lower court cases consid-
ering Indian citizenship).
142. 112 U.S. at 98.
143. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied by the United States




teenth amendment provides. 1" The Court held that because Elk was
born into a tribe, "an alien, though dependent, power," he owed "direct
and immediate allegiance" to the tribe, and was not a natural born citi-
zen.14 The Court considered next whether Elk became a citizen by re-
nouncing his tribe. In effect, the issue was whether his status was
determined by his actual condition, or by his legal status. Earlier cases,
such as Cisna "I and Dred Scott, 4 7 had suggested that the status of Indi-
ans depended on their relationship to their tribes and their actual similar-
ity to white people. But the Court in Elk held that Elk's actual condition
did not determine his status because "the alien and dependent condition
of the members of the Indian tribes could not be put off at their own will,
without the action or assent of the United States Congress. ' 148 Particu-
larly persuasive to Justice Gray was a treaty with the Seneca and others
that conferred citizenship on members deemed to be educated and self-
sufficient. The treaty reconstituted the tribe with Indians who "remained
in the tribal condition," "orphans," "incompetents," and those likely to
become public charges. 149 In accepting this definition of the tribe, Gray
implicitly equated tribal membership with republican incapacity. Be-
cause the standing naturalization acts did not apply to Indians,150 the
civil status of Indians and membership in the federal polity depended
entirely on the discretion of the federal sovereign.
Crow Dog and Elk reveal the imperial and republican dimensions of
the federal sovereign. Like a republic, the federal sovereign could not
annex the tribes, alien and dependent powers, or accept their members,
who were dependent and incapacitated, into the federal political commu-
nity. But the federal sovereign was an empire too. And that sovereign
extended its authority over the tribes and their members to define their
status and role.
In response to Crow Dog, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act1"'
which made certain serious crimes between tribal members in tribal terri-
144. "All Persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend.
Xiv, § 1.
145. 112 U.S. at 102.
146. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
147. In Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856), Chief Justice Taney, in analyzing
Black Americans' rights to citizenship, suggested that Indians could become citizens merely by leav-
ing their tribes and living a civilized life.
148. 112 U.S. at 100.
149. Id. at 103-04 (citing Treaty of Feb. 23, 1867, 15 Stat. 513, 516).
150. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 155 (1942).
151. Indian Appropriation (Major Crimes) Act, ch. 341, §§ 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885).
[Vol. 37
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
tory punishable in federal court according to federal law. Ironically, the
republican concern with dependency, which excluded tribal members
from federal citizenship, did not preclude this assertion of federal impe-
rial authority, but rather justified it. This relationship between republican
and imperial ideologies was explained in United States v. Kagama.152
Kagama, an Indian, murdered a fellow Indian on a reservation in Cali-
fornia. Under the Major Crimes Act, he was to be tried in federal court
according to federal law. The Supreme Court heard the case to determine
whether the Act violated the state's right to try the case in its own courts
under state law. The Court upheld the Act as a valid exercise of inherent
authority over the tribes.
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their pro-
tection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must
exist in the [federal] government because it never has existed anywhere else,
because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes. 153
The Kagama court emphasized the dependency of the tribes:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities de-
pendent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. De-
pendent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people
of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. 154
The Court's conclusion that tribes within states are the concern of the
federal government and not the states displays the odd interaction of re-
publican and imperial rhetoric underlying the tribal-federal relationship.
The tribes' dependency is the foundation of their relationship to the fed-
eral sovereign. Because they are dependent on the federal sovereign, they
are not subject to state authority. Furthermore, the states could not be
trusted to accord the tribes the treatment they need as dependents. But
the Court's opinion suggests an imperial element to federal sovereignty
also-the federal government has governed the tribes in fact and the
states have not, and it is the only sovereign whose power can govern all
152. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
153. Id. at 384-85.
154. Id. at 383-84.
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the tribes. The federal sovereign's de facto control of all the tribes, there-
fore, trumps the state's claim to territorial sovereignty.
By the 1880s, the courts had constructed complex relationships be-
tween the tribes, their members, the states and the federal government.
Basically, the states were seen as republics unable to govern the tribe and
accept their members. The federal sovereign possessed attributes of both
the republic and the empire. As a republic, the federal sovereign could
not accept the tribe or tribal members as part of its political community.
But as an empire, it was uniquely able to govern all the tribes as separate,
distinct, and dependent communities. The characteristic which excluded
the tribes from the state and federal polities, their dependency, subjected
them to the imperial power of the federal empire.
B. Changing Views of Property and Tribes
After Elk and Kagama, Indians faced two legal obstacles to realiz-
ing the rights of citizenship: membership in a tribe and individual depen-
dence, presumed from that membership. By the late 1880s, the United
States was anxious to assimilate the tribes so that its responsibility as
their "guardian" would cease, and the land held by the tribes would be
made available to white settlement. 155 Many humanitarians concerned
with the condition of the Indians saw assimilation as the only way for
Indians to prosper and realize their rights as individuals. 156 Assimilation,
however, necessarily implied the destruction of the tribe. 57
The General Allotment Act,15 1 passed in 1887, was designed to
eliminate the obstacles of the tribe and the members' dependence by im-
posing a system of private property on tribal lands and transforming tri-
bal members into independent landowning citizens, prepared to
participate in the republic. The Act authorized the president to order
reservations allotted into pieces of private property.15 9 Each head of a
155. As white settlers pushed westward, the lands guaranteed to the tribes by treaties of the
1830s, '40s, and '50s were invaded by settlers claiming the land for themselves. To reduce conflicts
between the tribes and the settlers, the federal government made more land available to whites by
reducing the size of tribal holdings. Washburn, supra note 121, at 17-18; see also D. OTIS, THE
DAWES AcT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 20-21 (F. Prucha ed. 1973).
156. Washburn, supra note 121, at 18-19.
157. "The supreme aim of the friends of the Indian was to substitute white civilization for his
tribal culture, and they shrewdly sensed that the difference in the concepts of property was funda-
mental in the contrast between the two ways of life." F. COHEN, supra note 150, at 208; see also D.
OTIS, supra note 155, at 8-11.
158. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, cl. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 24
U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1982)).
159. The General Allotment Act provided:
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household could select an allotment for her or his family. 6 Title to the
allotments was to be held in trust by the federal government for a period
of years, when title would pass to the individual."'6 Upon receiving allot-
ments, Indians could be granted citizenship and become subject to the
civil and criminal jurisdiction of the state in which their land was located
if they "adopted the habits of civilized life."' 6 2 The surplus land remain-
ing after allotment was sold to white settlers by the government. The
proceeds of these sales were held in trust for the tribe with income to be
paid to tribal members. Although the Allotment Policy was designed to
destroy the tribal structure, the tribes continued to exist until Congress
terminated them by legislation.
163
In fact, the General Allotment Act failed to assimilate Indians into
white society as independent individuals.' Although many Indians be-
came citizens under the Act, and every Indian was made a citizen by the
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,165 the tribes remained communities dis-
tinguished from white society and the national economy. In addition to
cultural differences, the tribes were distinguished by their dislocation and
poverty.166 By imposing private property on the tribes, the General Al-
lotment Act destroyed the communities and economies that supported
tribal members.' 67 Furthermore, the General Allotment Act weakened
the tribes as governments by intruding federal power into internal tribal
affairs. Although the Allotment Act did not destroy the doctrine of tribal
That in all cases where any tribe or band of Indians has been, or shall hereafter be,
located upon any reservation created for their use, either by treaty stipulation or by
virtue of an act of Congress or executive order setting apart the same for their use, the
President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized, whenever in his opinion
any reservation or any part thereof of such Indians is advantageous for agricultural and
grazing purposes, to cause said reservation, or any part thereof, to be surveyed, or resur-
veyed if necessary, and to allot the lands in said reservations in severalty to any Indian
located thereon ....
Id. § 1, at 388.
160. Id. § 2, at 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 332 (1982)).
161. Id. § 5, at 389 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 348). Under the Allotment Act, land was held in
trust for 25 years; however, the president could unilaterally extend the trust. Id.
162. Id. § 6, at 390 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401).
163. Because tribal existence was a political matter, so was tribal destruction. From the perspec-
tive of the federal government, the tribes continued to exist until the policy which recognized them
changed.
164. See generally D. OTIs, supra note 155, at 124-55 (describing the results of the Allotment
Program).
165. Indian Citizenship Act, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1982)).
166. A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 336 (1970).
167. G. TAYLOR, THE NEw DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM 5-7 (1980).
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self-governance, it implicitly vested in the federal government many pow-
ers central to tribal self-government. In the name of enforcing the Act,
federal authority in the form of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, superseded
tribal authority over issues such as tribal consent to law suits, tribal
membership, and land tenure and use.168 As the impoverishing effects of
allotment became apparent in the 1920s and 1930s, federal authority over
the tribes and individual tribal members expanded because of their in-
creased need for protection and support. By the 1920s, the tribe, as an
incompetent and dependent community, was the institution through
which the federal government maintained control of the tribal members
and resources.
The decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
retained the republican and imperial rhetoric of the Reservation Period.
Republican principles of dependency continued to justify exclusive fed-
eral control of the tribes, their members, and resources. But imperial val-
ues emerged to redefine the character and function of property and to
guide federal activities. Under the General Allotment Act, private prop-
erty was supposed to support tribal members in the tradition of republi-
canism. But in the early twentieth century, the judiciary no longer
viewed property as the source of republican independence and status.
Rather, property was viewed an investment, or a commodity to generate
wealth and income for the tribes and tribal members. And federal au-
thority was exercised to generate wealth for the tribes, while at the same
time, serving federal economic and resource interests.
The Court's opinions in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 16 9 and Tiger v.
Western Investment Co. 17o demonstrate how the republican values em-
bodied in the Allotment Act were being replaced with the imperial values
which supported the commercial expansion of the nation. In Lone Wolf,
the confederated tribes of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache sought to
enjoin the federal government from allotting their reservation. The tribes
claimed that, under the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, the federal gov-
ernment needed to secure the consent of three-fourths of the adult males
before alloting the land.1 7 1 Three-fourths of the tribes had not consented
to the allotment.
The tribes argued that allotment constituted a taking within the
168. See, eg., Cherokee Nation v. Stevens 174 U.S. 445 (1889); see also Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
169. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
170. 221 U.S. 286 (1911).
171. Medicine Lodge Treaty, Oct. 21, 1867. art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585.
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meaning of the fifth amendment, 172 specifically, a taking of their right to
communal ownership. They claimed that, by the treaty they were
vested with an interest in the lands held in common within the resevation,
which interest could not be divested by Congress in any other mode than
that specified in [the treaty], and that as a result of the said stipulation the
interest of the Indians in the common lands fell within the protection of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and such inter-
est... came under the control of the judicial branch of the government. 173
The Court rejected the tribes' claim, invoking familiar images of re-
publican dependency to deny that they had a complaint against the
United States,174 and doctrine reaffirming the imperial power of Congress
to abrogate Indian treaties which did not serve national interests. 175 The
Court denied finally that allotment effected a taking of any property
right, relying on an imperial vision of property. "[T]he action of Con-
gress now complained of was but an exercise of such [plenary] power, a
mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property."' 176 Sig-
nificantly, the Court did not uphold the allotment as necessary to civiliz-
ing or assimilating the tribes. The republican values underlying the
allotment policy never enter the Court's opinion because it viewed prop-
erty, not as the foundation of republican government, but as an invest-
ment that could take many different forms.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Tiger v. Western Investment Co.
also demonstrates that property was losing its significance as the founda-
tion for republican citizenship. Tiger, an Indian, sued to rescind two land
transactions, claiming they were invalid because Congress had restricted
his ability to alienate his land.'77 The land companies argued that the
restriction on Tiger's land was unconstitutional, inconsistent with his sta-
172. "[INor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
173. 187 U.S. at 564.
174. "The contention [of a vested right] in effect ignores the status of the contracting Indians
and the relation of dependency they bore and continue to bear towards the government of the United
States." Id.
175. Congress's plenary power over the tribes included the power
to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be
exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in
disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the coun-
try and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.... [I]t was never doubted that the
power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be
availed of from considerations of governmental policy ....
Id. at 566.
176. Id. at 568; see also Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
177. Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876. §§ 19, 22, 34 Stat. 137, 144-45.
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tus as a citizen, and denied him property without due process of law.178
The Court rejected the land companies' arguments, relying on the
federal government's plenary power over the tribes and its authority to
protect them and their property. The Court considered also whether Ti-
ger's citizenship removed him from the protective authority of the fed-
eral sovereign:
"We know of no reason, nor has any been suggested, why it was not
competent for Congress to declare that these Indians should be deemed
citizens of the United States, and entitled to the rights, privileges and im-
munities of citizens, while it retained, for the time being, the title to certain
lands, in trust for their benefit, and withheld from them for a certain period
the power to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of their interest in such
lands.... Citizenship does not carry with it the right on the part of the
citizen to dispose of land which he may own in any way that he sees fit
without reference to the character of the title by which it is held. The right
to sell property is not derived from, and is not dependent upon, citizenship;
neither does it detract in the slightest degree from the dignity or value of
citizenship that a person is not possessed of an estate, or, if possessed of an
estate, that he is deprived for the time being, of the right to alienate it."1 79
This opinion makes clear that citizenship was no longer related to repub-
lican independence based on property ownership. Tiger, as a citizen,
could participate in the federal political community even though he was
not "independent" in terms of the republic. Ironically though, his depen-
dent condition precluded him from participating freely in the
marketplace.
As the federal government assumed greater control over the tribes
and internal tribal matters, the tribes' governmental powers and political
capacity declined in practice and in doctrine. The tribe as a legal concept
persisted. But the legal definition of the tribe changed. Tribes no longer
were identified by their political relationship with the federal sovereign.
Rather, tribes were redefined in republican terms of race, dependency,
and difference from white society. The Supreme Court developed this
new legal definition of a "tribe" in the 1913 case United States v. Sando-
val.180 Sandoval was convicted for selling liquor to the Pueblo Indians of
New Mexico in violation of a federal law prohibiting the sale of alcohol
to Indians.' 1 Sandoval challenged his conviction, claiming that Congress
178. 221 U.S. at 310.
179. Id. at 312-13 (quoting Beck v. Flournoy Live-Stock & Real-Estate Co., 65 F. 30, 35 (8th
Cir. 1894)).
180. 231 U.S. 28.
181. Act of Jan. 30, 1897, ch. 109, 29 Stat. 506, as supplemented by the Enabling Act of June
20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 558.
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did not have protective authority over the Pueblos because they were not
tribes. The Pueblos differed from other Indians because the United States
had not acquired authority over them by the doctrine of discovery or
treaties. Rather, Mexico had ceded to the United States the territory of
New Mexico and its inhabitants, including the Pueblos.' 82 The Pueblos
had not made treaties with the United States, nor had they been subject
to federal legislative authority. Sandoval argued that because the political
relationship between the United States and the Pueblos differed from the
relationship between the United States and other Indian tribes, the Pue-
blos were not tribes. The Court held otherwise:
The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in
their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indi-
ans in race, customs, and domestic government. Always living in separate
and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influ-
enced by superstition and fetichism, and chiefly governed according to the
crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple,
uninformed and inferior people.1
83
jT]he legislative and executive branches of the Government have regarded
and treated the Pueblos of New Mexico as dependeit communities entitled
to its aid and protection, like other Indian tribes, and, considering their
Indian lineage, isolated and communal life, primitive customs and limited
civilization, this assertion of guardianship over them cannot be said to be
arbitrary but must be regarded as both authorized and controlling.
184
A community's status as a tribe did not depend on its political rela-
tionship to the United States or its governmental power. Rather, the term
"tribe" identified a community of people distinguished from white soci-
ety by their race, their location, and their culture.
C. Summary
The Indian law decisions of the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century reflect a change in the relationship of republican and
imperial rhetoric. As demonstrated by the Cherokee Tobacco Cases, fed-
eral power over the tribes was becoming increasingly imperial. The Court
and later Congress freed federal power from treaty promises and the
treaty making process so the federal sovereign could pursue its own inter-
ests unencumbered by obligations to the tribes. But Crow Dog, Elk, and
the General Allotment Act show that republican images continued to
182. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, art. 5, 9 Stat. 922, 926-28.
183. 231 U.S. at 39.
184. Id. at 47.
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inform the judiciary's view of the political relationship of citizens to the
federal sovereign. With the Major Crimes Act, Kagama, Lone Wolf, Ti-
ger, and Sandoval, republican dependence took on new significance. No
longer was it an obstacle to membership in the federal political commu-
nity. Rather, it was the justification for extraordinary federal involve-
ment in the activities of tribes and their members. Classical republican
values of land-based independence declined as the federal government
used property to generate income and wealth for the tribes.
V. MODERN INDIAN POLICY: 1934-PRESENT
The Great Depression and the New Deal legislation which followed
forced changes in the role and purposes of government, and in the sover-
eign relationships of the states and the federal government.185 By the
time of the Depression, the United States had developed a national econ-
omy. Industries were regional or national in scope and commerce ex-
tended throughout the country. These were supported by national
communication and transportation systems.1 86 The collapse of the econ-
omy, therefore, was a national rather than local catastrophy which called
for a national rather than local remedy. In response to the Depression,
the national government extended its commerce clause and spending
power authority to regulate social and economic issues formerly con-
trolled by local or state governments.1 8 7
Since the New Deal, federal power has continued to grow in relation
to the power of the states. Through bureaucracies built on specialization
and expertise, federal power, like imperial power, has managed economic
and social matters for the country as a whole. This imperial federal
power has challenged the independent sovereignty of the states and
forced them to change. State sovereignty has become more centralized,
bureaucratic, and imperial in managing affairs within its borders.
Although the federal government has dominated the states with social
185. See A. EKIRCH, IDEOLOGIES AND UTOPIAS 36-37 (1969); J. PATrERSON, THE NEW DEAL
AND THE STATES 198 (1981); Scheiber, From the New Deal to the New Federalism, 1933-1983, in
THE NEW DEAL LEGACY AND THE CONSTITUTION: A HALF-CENTURY RETROSPECT 1933-83, at 1
(1984).
186. "[S]tates were already being overtaken by the nationalizing of modem economic life [in the
1920s] .... [O]nly Congress could regulate railroads, establish nationwide labor standards, curb
monopolies and holding companies, and control the increasingly interstate character of commerce."
J. PATTERSON, supra note 185, at 24-25.
187. Scheiber, supra note 185, at 3-5. Such areas included agricultural and manufacturing regu-
lations, labor management, and welfare. For a general comparison of state activities before and after
the New Deal, see J. PATTERSON, supra note 185, at 3-25, 198-200.
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and economic legislation since the New Deal, the states have retained
sovereign authority to regulate matters within their police powers, to the
extent that such regulation does not interfere with national policies. 188
In this new system, the states are guided by two visions of imperial
power. Under the first, the states are agents of the federal government,
capable of administering and enforcing federal policies because of their
particular institutional competence to deal with local issues. State gov-
ernments serve as outposts, administering and enforcing the power of the
federal government. Under the second, the states retain and enhance
their sovereignty as they exercise more authority under their police pow-
ers. To the extent that such state power is independent of the federal
government, it is imperial in its centralized and instrumental manage-
ment of state affairs. The states are "mini-empires," extending their au-
thority to all social and economic matters within their borders.
The changes in the sovereign status of the tribes in federal Indian
policy and case law reflect these changes in federal and state sovereignty.
Immediately following the New Deal, the United States initiated a new
Indian policy, under the Indian Reorganization Act,189 to remedy
problems in Indian country that were identified as national concerns.
Under the Act, the United States resurrected the tribe as an economic
and political entity capable of representing its members' interests to the
federal legislature and bureaucracy, and in the marketplace.19° The fed-
eral government rejuvenated the tribe, as it created New Deal bureaus, to
administer and enforce federal programs and policies.
Within this imperial system, republican principles continued to in-
form images of legitimate government and support the federal-tribal rela-
tionship. Tribal governments were structured like the federal and state
governments and were based on participatory governance. 191 The federal
judiciary continued to use the republican rhetoric of dependency to ana-
lyze the relationship of the tribes and their members to the federal and
state sovereignties.
Beginning with the Termination Policy of the 1950s, 192 the courts'
views of state and tribal sovereignty began to change. They quit using the
republican rhetoric of dependency and incapacity and denied the sover-
188. See J. PATrERSON, supra note 185, at 194-207; Scheiber, supra note 185, at 4-6.
189. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-78 (1982)).
190. G. TAYLOR, supra note 167, at 17.
191. Id at 92-97.
192. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
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eign status of the tribes. Increasingly, the courts viewed tribes as crea-
tures of the federal government, subject to state authority to the extent
that it was not inconsistent with express federal policies. The courts up-
held state authority if federal policies recognized the states' particular
institutional competence to regulate matters on reservations, or if the
states had economic and territorial interests, independent of the federal
government, in activities on the reservation. Under the Termination and
later Self-Determination Policies, 193 federal sovereignty retained its im-
perial character while state sovereignty lost its republican character. By
the mid-1960s, republican values no longer barred the states from gov-
erning tribes and their members.
A. The Tribes as a National Cause
In the 1920s, it became evident that the General Allotment Act had
failed to transform the American Indian into the independent farmer
that had been envisioned in 1886.191 The Meriam Report,9 ' a 1928 gov-
ernment-commissioned study, concluded that the Allotment Policy con-
tributed to tribal poverty because "[t]he strength of the ancient system of
communal ownership was not realized."' 96 The Report called for, among
other changes, resurrecting the tribe to replace the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs as the primary means for governing the tribes. 197
To address the Report's recommendations, Congress passed the In-
dian Reorganization Act of 1934.198 Generally, the Act was designed to
foster tribal self-government and economic autonomy. Specifically, this
was to be achieved by consolidating tribal land and resource holdings
that had been lost or split up by the Allotment Policy, vesting the tribes
with authority to manage their land and resources, establishing a revolv-
ing credit fund for federally chartered tribal corporations, providing fi-
nancial support for tribal governments, and encouraging greater Indian
193. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
194. Debo explains:
For forty years, as tribe after tribe was liquidated and thousands upon thousands of
individuals entered, in theory, the general pattern of white life and culture, it had been
reported in terms of "progress." Now for the first time deplorable conditions of poverty,
disease, lack of social and economic adjustment, suffering, and discontent were uncov-
ered, and the allotment policy was cited as the main cause.
A. DEBO, supra note 166, at 288.
195. INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
(Meriam Report) (1928 & reprint 1971).
196. Id. at 460; see also G. TAYLOR, supra note 167, at 6-8, 14.
197. G. TAYLOR, supra note 167, at 17.
198. 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-78 (1982)).
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employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs.199
Because the Allotment Policy had effectively destroyed most tribal
governments by transferring many functions to the federal government,
the Indian Reorganization Act included provisions by which tribal gov-
ernments could be recreated, 00 provided a majority of the residents of a
reservation voted to adopt the provisions of the Act and ratified the tribal
constitution. If the members of a reservation rejected the Act, the reser-
vation would remain subject to the direct control of the Bureau.20 1 The
Act also provided that, on petition from at least one-third of the mem-
bers of a tribe subject to the Act, the tribe could be chartered as a corpo-
ration with limited power to manage its resources. 202 The Indian
Reorganization Act, therefore, took great steps in recreating the tribes,
and investing them with political and economic authority that had been
exercised previously by the federal government independent of tribal con-
sent.2 03 Although the Indian Reorganization Act represented a great
shift in federal Indian policy, it did not break with the goal of
assimilation."°
The Indian Reorganization Act was based on a mixture of republi-
can and imperial values similar to those underlying Indian policies of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.205 The Act reflects republi-
can ideology in two ways. As in the past, republican notions of depen-
dency and incapacity justified the federal policies that seemed to favor
tribal members or exempt them from state laws. Second, in its commit-
ment to local autonomy, tribal consent, and self-determination, the Act
implemented a fundamental republican ideal: the responsibility for gov-
ernment should fall to those who are governed.
At the same time, the relationships of both the federal government
and the tribes to the states were cast in imperial terms. Courts upheld
tribal sovereignty and exemptions against state challenges, reasoning that
the federal government bore a duty to protect the tribes and that this
duty, as a federal matter, was superior to the rights and interests of the
states. Implicitly, the goals of the Indian Reorganization Act, namely
199. G. TAYLOR, supra note 167, at 92-118.
200. 48 Stat. § 16, at 987 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982)).
201. Id. § 318 at 988 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1982)).
202. Id. § 17, at 988 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1982)).
203. G. TAYLOR, supra note 167, at 92-118.
204. Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139,
145 (1977).
205. See supra notes 114-84 and accompanying text.
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tribal economic and political self-determination, were identified as na-
tional goals incumbent upon the state and federal governments.
Board of County Commissioners v. Seber, °6 decided in 1943, is rep-
resentative of opinions under the Reorganinzation Act and reflects the
new relationship of the federal and state sovereigns. In Seber, Oklahoma
challenged the constitutionality of federal statutes20 7 authorizing the re-
moval of qualified Indian lands from the state tax rolls, upon application
of the landowner. The state argued that these Acts intruded into its au-
thority and diminished its base of taxable land.
In upholding the Acts, the Court first characterized the condition of
the Indians as a national problem, one the federal government created
and bore responsibility for solving.
In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United State overcame the
Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving
them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection
against the selfishness of others and their own improvidence. Of necessity,
the United States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with
it the authority to do all that was required to perform that obligation and to
prepare the Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of
the modern body politic.2 08
Next, the Court considered the state's complaint that the Acts di-
minished its tax base. The Court held that the federal sovereign, like an
imperial sovereign, could fulfill its objectives by compromising the inter-
ests of the state. Congress was free to balance the interests at stake and to
choose the means by which to achieve its end.
[The Acts] are appropriate means by which the federal government protects
its guardianship and prevents the impairment of a considered program un-
dertaken in discharge of the obligation of that guardianship. The fact that
the Acts withdraw lands from the tax rolls and may possibly embarrass the
finances of a state or one of its subdivisions is for the consideration of Con-
gress, not the courts.20 9
Judicial decisions under the Reorganization Act supported federal
policies exempting tribes and their members from certain state authority.
The federal government undertook those policies to fulfill a duty to the
tribes, arising from the government's responsibility for making the tribes
dependent. To satisfy that duty, the federal government could limit states
206. 318 U.S. 705.
207. Act of June 20, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-716, 49 Stat. 1542; Act of May 19, 1937, Pub. L. No.
75-96, 50 Stat. 188.
208. 318 U.S. at 715.
209. Id. at 718.
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authority over the tribes and their members. National issues took
supremacy over state interests as the federal sovereign managed the
states and tribes in its own best interest.
B. Federal Control of State and Tribal Powers
In the 1950s, opponents within Congress, the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (BIA), and the federal judiciary challenged the federal commitment
to tribal self-government and economic development.21 Under the Ter-
mination Policy, adopted in 1953,211 Congress and the BIA undertook a
comprehensive program to subject tribal members to state criminal and
civil jurisdiction, to transfer responsibility for Indian education and
health services to the states, to authorize non-Indians to use and
purchase Indian lands, to encourage Indian removal from rural reserva-
tions to urban areas, and to discourage tribal economic development. Ap-
proximately 109 tribes and bands were terminated during ths time.212
Underlying the Termination Policy was a belief that the special tribal-
federal relationship, on which the Indian Reorganization Act was based,
was "un-American" and counterproductive of the goal of assimilation. 1 3
By attacking the special relationship between the tribes and the federal
sovereign, proponents of termination implicitly rejected the republican
values that justified extraordinary federal protection of tribal govern-
ments and economies.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress was retreating from the
Termination Policy. But Congress and the judiciary continued to reject
the notion that the United States owed the tribes a duty of protection.
Rather, the tribes were increasingly recognized as local governments
210. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 204, at 145-49.
211. In 1953 the House of Representatives passed a resolution which provided in part:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within
the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the
same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United
States and to grant them all the rights . . . and prerogatives pertaining to American
citizenship... it is declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time,
all of the Indian tribes and the individual members thereof [in certain states and in
certain tribes]. . .should be freed from Federal supervision and control and from all
disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians ....
H.R., Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132. This resolution, though technically only a policy statement that
is no longer binding on Congress, continues to generate political pressure on the tribes. Wilkinson &
Biggs, supra note 204, at 149-51.
212. A series of 14 acts from 1954 to 1962 effected the termination. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra
note 204, at 151.
213. Id. at 154.
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with limited independence from state and local governments.214 The key
to this independence was the tribes' relationship to the federal govern-
ment. A series of legislative acts passed between 1966 and 1975215 sought
to vest in the tribes and their members civil,216 governmental,21 7 and eco-
nomic2  rights that would enhance tribal self-government and economic
development, and supplement the Indian Reorganization Act.
During this period of termination and subsequent self-determina-
tion, the federal judiciary moved from an analysis premised on the tribes'
dependence, to one based on federal and state imperialism. Republican
rhetoric of dependency and recognition of tribal sovereignty disappeared
from judicial opinions during the Termination Period. Without the limit-
ing principle of republican dependency, which had shielded tribes and
their members from state jurisdicition, state authority over tribal affairs
expanded greatly.
State authority over tribal land and members is now limited only by
federal authority which preempts state regulation. Tribal sovereignty as a
doctrine has no force against state and federal jurisdiction. Rather, the
federal judiciary analyzes the status and rights of the tribes as if they are
creatures of the federal government. State sovereignty in this preemption
analysis is conceived in "quasi-imperial" terms. Either the states are ex-
ercising powers delegated to them by the federal government, or they are
asserting their independent sovereignty over the tribes within their bor-
ders. Like an imperial possession, the states enforce the policies and
power of the federal empire. Like an empire, the states can tolerate for-
eign political entities within their borders, and exercise sovereignty over
214. Id. at 162-63.
215. For a general outline of these legislative acts, see Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nation.
alism and Its Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 617, 624-29
(1976).
216. By the Act of Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-635, 80 Stat. 880 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1362
(1982)), Congress granted federal district courts jurisdiction to hear suits brought by tribes them-
selves without the United States as guardian. The Act of Apr. 11, 1968 (Indian Civil Rights Act),
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1982 & Supp. 1987)),
extended constitutional protections against tribal, state, and federal government actions to tribal
members.
217. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat.
2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-n (1982 & Supp. 1987)), authorized tribes to
contract with the secretaries of the interior and health and human welfare to assume responsibility
for delivering governmental, health, and education services to tribal members.
218. The Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (codified as




them. Under both models, the federal government determines the extent
of state authority over the tribes.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,21 9 is one of the first decisions
of the Court during the Termination Period. This case illustrates the de-
cline of republican rhetoric and the notion of a national duty to the
tribes. Tee-Hit-Ton involved claims by Alaska Natives against the federal
government under the fifth amendment taking clause. The Natives were
seeking compensation for the value of timber taken by the United States
from land which they claimed by Indian title. The United States claimed
that because no treaty or act of Congress formally recognized Indian title
in Alaska, the Natives had no compensable interest. In analyzing the
status and rights of the Alaska Natives, Justice Reed relied on imperial
images of sovereign power to hold that "Indian occupation of land with-
out government recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking
or extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or
any other principle of law."2z Reed explained that the nation's expan-
sion required that Congress be free and flexible in managing Indian
affairs:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent
were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the
Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of
their land.
In light of the history of Indian relations in this Nation, no other course
would meet the problem of the growth of the United States except to make
congressional contributions for Indian lands rather than to subject the Gov-
ernment to an obligation to pay the value when taken with interest to the
date of payment. Our conclusion does not uphold harshness as against ten-
derness toward the Indians, but it leaves with Congress, where it belongs,
the policy of Indian gratuities for the termination of Indian occupancy of
Goverment-owned land rather than making compensation for its value a
rigid constitutional principle.22'
Although the Indian Reorganization Act was premised on the find-
ing that Indian poverty and dislocation were caused by the policies of the
United States, and were the responsibility of the United States to remedy,
the Court denied that the federal government was obliged to protect the
Natives' property. Rather, like an empire, the federal sovereign could
219. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
220. Id. at 285.
221. Id. at 289-91.
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formulate Indian policy to serve its own resource and economic interests.
During the next two decades, this principle extended to tribal sovereign
rights as republican rhetoric and the notion of a federal obligation disap-
peared altogether.
Williams v. Lee,222 decided four years later, offered an analysis of
tribal and state sovereignty which made clear the imperial relationship
between the United States and the tribes, and the developing imperial
character of state sovereignty. A federally licensed Indian trader who
operated a store on the Navajo reservation sued the defendants, members
of the Navajo tribe, in state court to recover money owed to him. After
losing in the state courts, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court,
claiming that the tribal courts, not the state courts, had jurisdiction to
hear the case.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the tribal courts and held that
the state violated the tribe's right to self-government by assuming juris-
diction over the case. The Court explained that the tribes originally were
"separate nations. ' 22' However, over the years, the tribes "g[a]ve up
complete independence and the right to go to war in exchange for federal
protection, aid, and grants of land." '2 24 Relying on Worcester v. Georgia,
the Court held, "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."22
The Court emphasized that the relationship between the tribes and the
state was a matter of federal policy:
Congress has followed a policy calculated eventually to make all Indians
full-fledged participants in American society. This policy contemplates
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians by any State ready to assume
the burdens that go with it as soon as the educational and economic status
of the Indians permits the change without disadvantage to them.226
The Court concluded by writing, "If this power [of self-government]
is to be taken away from [the tribe], it is for Congress to do it."'22 7 Tribal
sovereignty or self-governance, therefore, was really a matter of federal
policy. Because Congress exercised complete control over the tribes, the
222. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
223. Id. at 218.
224. Id..
225. Id. at 220. For a discussion of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), see supra
notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
226. 358 U.S. at 220-21.
227. Id. at 223.
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powers that the tribe retained or lost were attributed to a conscious pol-
icy decision of Congress.
Although most tribes survived the Termination Policy of the 1950s,
the threat of termination had stifled economic and political develop-
ment.228 Tribes that petitioned the federal government for program funds
or money due on land claims might be forced to accept restrictions on
their governmental rights and economic authority, or even to accept ter-
mination as a condition of receiving their money. Under the Termination
Policy, tribes devoted all their resources to political and economic sur-
vival and could not focus on political and economic development. 229 By
the early 1960s, only tribes with a strong economic base, independent of
federal funds, survived as effective governments.230 But during the late
1960s and 1970s, many tribes began to recover. Under the Great Society
Programs, tribes were recognized as local governments eligible to partici-
pate in federal programs.3 The Indian Self-Determination and Educa-
tion Assistance Act of 1975 also reaffrmed the tribe as the focus for
Indian economic development and government.232 By these programs,
the federal government again recognized the tribe as a responsible gov-
erning entity. As a result, tribal members began to recognize the tribe as
a source of economic support and cultural identity.233 With support from
the federal government and tribal members, tribes have developed eco-
nomically and and gained greater governmental authority.
Although many tribes have gained some economic and political in-
dependence from the federal government, judicial decisions continue to
conceptualize tribal economic, governmental, and political authority as
creatures of the federal government. Tribal authority is defined by the
federal sovereign, acting like an empire, after weighing the federal, tribal,
and state interests at stake.
228. J. WisE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 368-69 (1971).
229. Id.
230. The only tribes able to support themselves, "on a significant scale" under the Indian Reor-
ganization Act were the Osage of Oklahoma, who had oil royalities, and the Uintah and Ouray tribes
of Utah, who won a $31,000,000 claim against the United States. Id. at 382.
231. Id. at 381.
232. See supra note 217.
233. With responsibility for administering these programs,
Indian reservations were able to tap an immediate source of strength that they had not
previously had access to. A strong sense of tribal identity began to build as people who
had long since forsaken the tribe returned to claim membership and regain their place in
the reservation communities. The trend of gradual dissipation of young people which
had plagued the tribal groups for over a century was reversed. In this aspect the Poverty
program was critical in establishing a new sense of identity among Indian people.
3. WIsE, supra note 228, at 383.
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The Court's opinion in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commis-
sion,2 34 decided in 1973, shows how principles of the empire inform cur-
rent determinations of state, tribal, and federal power. The issue before
the Court was whether Arizona could impose its personal income tax on
a reservation Indian who earned all her income within the reservation.
The Court's opinion first adopted an imperial view of state sovereignty.
Justice Marshall wrote, the controversy between the state and the tribe
"requires us once again to reconcile the plenary power of the States over
residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indi-
ans living on tribal reservations. 2 3' The Court assumed that a state, like
an empire, governed all matters within its borders. State authority over
tribes and their members was no longer limited by republican principles.
Despite the extent of state sovereignty, the Court held the state tax inva-
lid because it "interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and stat-
utes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the
Indians themselves. '2 36 Although Marshall acknowledged the tribes' his-
tory of nationhood and sovereignty independent of state jurisdiction, he
wrote:
[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a
bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption. The
modem cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sov-
ereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which
define the limits of state power.
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it pro-
vides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides
a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must
be read. It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were
once independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty
long predates that of our own Government.237
Marshall proceeded to analyze the relevant treaty and statute and
found that the government intended to exempt the income of reservation
Indians from state income tax. The Court could have cited the broad
national commitment to tribal self-government and self-determination,
embodied in the Indian Reorganization Act, as the policy which pre-
empted the state tax. Instead, the Court chose to rely on the narrower
federal policy exempting tribal members' income from state taxation.238
234. 411 U.S. 164.
235. Id. at 165.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 172 (citations & footnotes omitted).
238. Id. at 181.
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Under this preemption analysis, tribal authority had to be recog-
nized by the federal government by either a long-standing practice or a
definitive policy. Otherwise, the tribe was subject to state authority. The
tribes' dependency on the federal government, which previously pre-
cluded state jurisdiction, no longer limited state authority over the tribes.
The Court's 1980 opinion in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation239 clarified the relationships underlying
the preemption analysis. All the tribes involved in the suit had developed
their own taxing schemes to raise revenue for governmental services. In
addition to the tribal taxes, the state imposed three taxes: an excise tax on
cigarettes sold to nonmembers; a general retail tax on sales of personal
property to non-members; and a motor vehicle excise tax on all tribal
vehicles that used state roads. The state conceded that it could not tax
intra-tribal sales of cigarettes or personal property, or vehicles used ex-
clusively on the reservation.
The state challenged first the authority of the tribe to impose taxes
on non-Indian purchasers. Rejecting this claim, the Court explained that
the tribes could tax transactions on the reservation because, under fed-
eral policy, the tribes retained the power to tax.
The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and signifi-
cantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sover-
eignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or
necessary implication of their dependent status.
[F]ederal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing power.
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' depen-
dent status. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases where the
exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding in-
terests of the National Government .... 240
The tribes' power to tax, therefore, was a power retained under federal
law. But like a possession of an empire, the tribes' authority was subject
to the federal sovereign and limited by overriding federal interests.
Although the Court upheld the tribes' authority to tax, based on
federal policy, it found that the state also had authority to tax the same
transactions. The tribes argued that their taxing schemes precluded state
taxes for three reasons: first, federal statutes regulating Indian affairs pre-
empted state taxation; second, the state taxes were inconsistent with the
239. 447 U.S. 134.
240. Id. at 152-53.
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principle of tribal self-government; third, the taxes were invalid by the
'negative implications' of the Commerce Clause. ' 241
The Court rejected the tribes' preemption argument for several rea-
sons. Most significantly, the Court denied that tribal taxes merely ap-
proved by the federal government preempted state taxation.
[A]Ithough the Tribes themselves could perhaps pre-empt state taxation
through the exercise of properly delegated federal power to do so, we do not
infer from the mere fact of federal approval of the Indian taxing ordinances,
or from the fact that the Tribes exercise congressionally sanctioned powers
of self-government, that Congress has delegated the far-reaching authority
to pre-empt valid state sales and cigarette taxes otherwise collectible from
nonmembers of the Tribe.242
The inherent sovereign powers of the tribes themselves, absent dele-
gated federal authority, do not preempt states from exercising jurisdic-
tion over the reservations. Rather, tribal authority may preempt state
jurisdiction only if it is a delegation of federal authority pursuant to a
federal legislative scheme. As the Court explained, "[t]he principle of tri-
bal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in
congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of
the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of
the State, on the other. '243 In the Court's view, therefore, the federal
sovereign managed Indian affairs according to the principles of the em-
pire: state and tribal interests were balanced against each other to meet
overriding national interests.
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,2" decided by the Court in
1983, makes clear the imperial foundations of state and tribal authority
under the preemption analysis. The Mescalero Apache Tribe had devel-
oped, in conjunction with the federal government, a hunting and fishing
resort on its reservation. The tribe, with the help of the federal govern-
ment, managed its wildlife to accomodate this commercial use. The state
sought to impose its more stringent wildlife regulations on non-Indians
hunting on the reservation. The Court denied the state's claim, finding
that the federal government's involvement with the tribal venture pre-
empted state regulation.
The Court acknowledged that the state could have jurisdiction to
regulate wildlife on the reservation. But "[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-
241. Id. at 154.
242. Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
243. Id.
244. 462 U.S. 324.
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empted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state author-
ity." '245 The state was preempted from regulating non-Indian fishing and
hunting on the reservation, the Court held, because the tribal resort and
wildlife management program was developed as part of a federal pro-
gram of tribal economic development. "[W]hen a tribe undertakes an en-
terprise under the authority of federal law, an assertion of state authority
must be viewed against any interference with the successful accomplish-
ment of the federal purpose.,2 4 6 This economic development could be
distinguished from the economic development associated with the sale of
tax-exempt cigarettes in Colville because the federal government was inti-
mately involved in the tribe's resort. It is this federal involvement and
identification with a specific federal purpose, that protects tribal govern-
mental and economic interests from state intrusion. By qualifying federal
preemption with sufficiently important state interests, the Court left
room for the states to pursue their own interests on the reservation, de-
spite federal and tribal policies. State authority over Indian matters
within state borders, the Court suggests, is not restricted by tribal gov-
ernmental authority exercised under federal law if the state's welfare
would be adversely affected by activities on the reservation.
C. Summary
In the last fifty years, the ideological foundation of Indian policy
and law has shifted from one that mixed republican rhetoric and imperial
values, to one based solely on imperial visions of federal and state author-
ity. The cases following the Indian Reorganization Act continued to in-
voke republican notions of dependency to justify federal authority over
the tribes. But the federal power arising from that dependency was impe-
rial in nature. With publication of the Meriam Report, the poverty and
suffering of the tribes was recognized as a national responsibility and
identified with the national interest. This committed the federal govern-
ment to the tribes' welfare for their sake, as well as for the sake of the
United States. In addition, this federal duty of protection owed to the
tribes was, as a national issue, supreme to the interests of the states. As
the Court's opinion in Seber made clear, the federal duty justified ex-
traordinary intrusions into state affairs on behalf of the tribes and their
245. Id. at 334.
246. Id. at 336.
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members because conditions in Indian country, like other national
problems of the day, compelled the federal government to act.
The Termination and Self-Determination Policies and the judicial
decisions made under them broke from the ideology of the first half of
the century. In McClanahan, Colville, and Mescalero, the judiciary in-
voked imperial principles to define the rights of the federal and state sov-
ereigns. Under the preemption doctrine, tribal authority is fused with
federal authority because without a preemptive federal policy, tribes are
subject to state authority. Republican rhetoric no longer incapacitates
the states from governing the tribes or imposes on the federal govern-
ment a special duty of protection. Rather, the federal government, like an
empire, promulgates Indian policy to serve its own interests, and when
federal policy fails to identify tribal interests with overriding federal in-
terests, states can extend their authority over the tribes and their
members.
VI. CONCLUSION
Indian law is an anomoly in American constitutional law. The Con-
stitution contemplates two types of sovereigns only-the federal sover-
eign and the state sovereigns. The Constitution, therefore, fails to
account for the sovereignty of the tribes. Though their sovereignty was
well recognized in international legal doctrine in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, principles of international law failed to justify the supreme sover-
eign authority over the tribes that the federal government quickly
claimed. Neither the regime of law under the Constitution nor the princi-
ples of international law could explain how the tribes could be independ-
ent sovereigns but subject to federal sovereign authority. In formulating
federal Indian policy and in analyzing the sovereign relationships of the
tribes, the states, and the federal government, Congress and the federal
judiciary have had to reach beyond the terms of the Constitution and
international law to the principles of political organization and sover-
eignty which informed their visions of the world. Throughout the history
of tribal-federal relations, therefore, the federal judiciary has invoked
principles of imperialism and republicanism to analyze and define the
legal status and rights of the tribes.
In the early nineteenth century, the judiciary invoked both ideolo-
gies to explain and define the rights and status of the tribes. As John
Marshall held in the Cherokee Cases, the tribes possessed organic sover-
eignty, which the United States recognized through treaties with them,
and which precluded state jurisdiction over their territory. In this opin-
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ion, the Court enforced an imperial vision of the federal sovereigns as
capable of incorporating and governing the tribes, and a republican vi-
sion of the state sovereigns as unable to tolerate the tribes, foreign sover-
eigns within their borders. The republican incapacities of the states
justified the Removal Policy, which removed tribes from within states to
land west of the Mississippi River, where they could be assimilated. This
basic mixture of ideological principles persisted well into the twentieth
century. But in the second half of the nineteenth century, the terms and
significance of the rhetoric changed.
During the middle of the nineteenth century, the United States pur-
sued an agressively expansionist policy. Imperial values dominated judi-
cial analyses of the tribal-federal relationship as federal authority over
the tribes increased. But republican principles of independence and ho-
mogeneity emerged to define the relationship of the tribes and their mem-
bers to the states. Later in the century, from the 1850s to the 1890s, the
federal government also pursued policies of forced assimilation under the
Reservation Policy and the General Allotment Act. The push for these
policies was both imperial and republican. It was imperial in that the
United States asserted absolute sovereignty over the tribes and pursued
these policies to open more land to white settlement and exploitation.
But these policies were also republican because they sought to address
the need for homogeneity by assimilating Indians into white society. Fur-
thermore, Indian citizenship, by judicial decisions as well as the General
Allotment Act, was tied directly to ownership of private property. Values
of the republic concerned with homogeneity and landed independence,
therefore, drove federal Indian policy and Indian law decisions into the
late nineteenth century.
In the twentieth century, the judiciary continued to invoke the re-
publican rhetoric of dependency to justify federal policies designed to
protect the tribes and their members. But classical republican values ty-
ing citizenship and independence to private property gave way to the
economic values of the empire. In the early twentieth century, property
lost its republican significance and was viewed as a source of income for
tribes and their members. Under the Indian Reorganization Act, republi-
can values informed ideas about legitimate tribal governments and con-
tinued to justify extraordinary federal measures to protect tribal
members from state policies. But those federal policies were premised on
imperial principles-the federal sovereign, like an empire, could compro-
mise state power over tribes in the interest of remedying the nation's
problem of the poor condition of tribal communities.
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In the second half of this century, under the Termination and later
Self-Determination Policies, the federal judiciary and Congress rejected
republican principles of dependency to deny that the federal government
bore a duty of protection to the tibes. Republican principles, therefore,
have disappeared from judicial analyses of the relationships of the tribes
to the federal government and the states. Coincidentally, the Supreme
Court has largely rejected the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, as distin-
guished from tribal governance. Tribal rights of self-government pres-
ently are creatures of the federal sovereign. Similarly, federal policy,
through the preemption doctrine, determines also the extent of state sov-
ereignty over the tribes, their members, and their territories. In modern
Indian law, the judiciary enforces an imperial vision of state sovereignty
which extends to all matters within its borders. State authority over
tribes no longer is limited by the tribes' dependency. Rather, preemptive
federal policies are the only restrictions on state power over the tribes. As
an empire, the federal government weighs the interests of itself, the
tribes, and the states to develop policies that will serve the interest of the
whole nation.
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